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Chapter 1
Introduction
During the Great Recession more than half of the total decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in the US was, according to Berger and Vavra (2015), assigned to decreases in residential
investment and new durable consumption goods. Further, residential investment had accounted
for 58 percent and new durable consumption goods for 26.6 percent of GDP changes during
recessions between 1960 and 2013. Since both are highly volatile, pro-cyclical, and weaken
GDP in particular at the beginning of a recession, Leamer (2007) concludes, "Housing IS the
business cycle". Residential structures and durable consumption goods are similar by nature; in
contrast to most real assets, both are not input factors of production, but increase the consumer’s
utility directly. As a consequence, they are rather held by final consumers than firms, and thus,
such assets are more private and serve a specific purpose. The similar internal and business
cycle characteristics motivate the topics of the three essays in this thesis. These essays deal with
puzzles and solution approaches or applications in differentiating between productive, market
and utility augmenting, private assets inside Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
models. DSGE models are a workhorse of modern business cycle research.
Although DSGE models are well-established in macroeconomics, they are also often subject
to criticism. The thesis does not contribute to this debate, I rather want to make a point that
each element of this acronym is necessary and offers further advantages to study the object
under investigation. First, the large contribution of private investment goods to the business
cycle raises questions about their effects on the overall economy. Second, the high volatility
and the pro-cyclicality raises questions about the effects of overall economic activity onto these
investment goods. In general equilibrium all prices and quantities are interdependent, and thus,
this is an appropriate framework to study such feedback systems. Since it is indisputable that
business cycles evolve over time and that the future is uncertain, it is essential to take dynamics
and stochastics into account. A second argument for dynamics is the missing rationale behind
investments in a static world. Consequently, in a dynamic and stochastic economy, the decisions
on today’s investment depend on an uncertain future, and thereby, the agent’s current activities
are determined to some extent by expectations of the future. The model’s stochastic feature
enables statistical inference; thus, in this thesis maximum-likelihood and Bayesian estimation or
methods of moments are applied wherever meaningful.
As DSGE models are an appropriate tool, the distinction of market and privately used assets
has a long tradition inside this framework. Early attempts of such distinctions by Greenwood and
Hercowitz (1991) and Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) established a strand of literature
on heterogeneous capital goods, as their models tend to generate anomalies in investment
activities. All models in the thesis at hand tend to generate these anomalies as well, namely
excessive volatility and counterfactual negative correlated movements of the investment goods.
The intuition is straightforward: From an agent’s perspective the quantity of interest is the
size of the capital stocks which depreciates annually, say about 10 percent. Consequently, a
reduction of 100 percent in the quantity of an investment leads only to a 10 percent reduction of
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the concerning capital stock per year and an investment has a half-life of approximately 7 years.
Thus, short-run investment reductions have a small impact and increases have persistent effects.
Different investment goods are therefore highly substitutable in the short-run, and hence, small
temporary changes in the relative price – or the usability – lead to excessive adjustments and
negatively correlated fluctuations. Shocks change the relative usability of the assets because the
specific purpose of the private asset entails an asymmetry. For instance, the market asset can be
used to build up the private asset but not vice versa, and to that end, a positive productivity
shock increases investments in the market asset first. This asymmetry is reinforced if only market
assets are directly related to productivity.
Chang (2000) shows that adjustment costs to investment or capital may solve the excess
volatility and negatively correlated movement puzzle. As investment adjustments become costly,
substitution becomes costly, too, which limits the effect of relative price changes on the demand
side. Based on this result, all models in the three essays have the following common features: at
least two types of assets, one augments labor productivity and one utility, and both are subject to
adjustment costs. However, the interpretation of the utility-augmenting asset differs. In Chapter
2 and 3 this asset is the stock of houses, which is a composite of residential structures and land,
a fixed input factor. In Chapter 4 the utility-augmenting asset is represented by the stock of
durable consumption goods.
While the field of housing and the business cycle was a niche, the Great Recession made it
fashionable (see e.g. Davis and Nieuwerburgh (2015) or Iacoviello (2010)). The pioneer work
of Davis and Heathcote (2005) takes the neoclassical perspective, where markets are perfect
and the supply side induces the entire business cycle fluctuation. The pioneer work of Iacoviello
(2005) uses the New Keynsian perspective, where markets are imperfect and the demand side
accounts for business cycles as well. The former work tries to account for stylized facts of the
business cycle by modeling a multi-sectoral input-output linked supply structure. The following
stylized facts are valid for the most developed economies: i) residential investment is at least
moderately more volatile than business investment, ii) house prices are at least twice as volatile
as GDP, and iii) house prices, business investment as well as GDP are positively correlated with
residential investment. While Davis and Heathcote (2005) achieve success in explaining the
stylized facts concerning the quantities, they fail doing so for the facts concerning house prices.
Iacoviello (2005) illustrates an amplification of demand shocks through housing collateral
constraints, which coincides with observations made during the Great Recession. This is why
a huge strand of literature builds on Iacoviello (2005) and reduces the structural form of the
supply side to the extent that some business cycle statistics could barely be matched. Further,
the literature concludes that supply-side – or strictly spoken technology – shocks solely cannot
account for the positive correlation of prices and quantities in the housing market and the high
residential investment volatility at once (see e.g. Iacoviello and Neri (2010)). This is first due
to the inability of the Davis and Heathcote (2005) model to account for the positive correlation
between house prices and residential investment. Additionally, in partial equilibrium, a shift in
the demand curve leads to positively correlated prices and quantities and a shift in the supply
curve has the opposite effect. However, to account for the volatility of residential investments, it
is mostly assumed that large shocks affect the supply of residential goods. Chapters 2 and 3
check to which extent the stylized facts, including quantities and prices, could be explained in
neoclassic – strictly spoken Real Business Cycle (RBC) – models with deeper structures and real
frictions. To also gain insights into asset pricing in general, Chapter 3 additionally investigates
asset return behavior.
In detail, in the first essay (Chapter 2) "Housing and the business cycle revisited", already
published as Fehrle (2019), I argue that Davis and Heathcote (2005) strip the supply side down
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by assuming that sectoral productivity is driven by a reduced-form process with correlated
shocks. The success of the model’s ability to account for the stylized facts of the quantities
depends heavily on this assumption since without correlated shocks in sectoral productivity e.g.
the quantities of both investment types are negatively correlated. The assumption of correlated
shocks keeps changes in the relative price of business and residential investments small, and
thereby, prevents large substitutions but transfers explanation content outside the model towards
the reduced-form process.
With this result in mind, I show that variable capital utilization, business investment adjust-
ment costs, and a higher cost share of land in new houses resolve the negative correlation puzzle
without relying on correlated shocks. Note that land acts similarly to adjustment costs. The
introduction and the increase of adjustment costs, respectively, limit the substitution effect to
the extent that the income effect dominates. Variable capital utilization enhances the income
effect. To this end, all GDP subaggregates are positively correlated and the model indeed keeps
the explanatory power of the concerning volatilities well. The income effect of productivity
shocks on inputs which are less intensive in the production of residential investment goods
is so prevailing that house prices and residential investment are positive correlated as well.
From a supply and demand model perspective, the mentioned shocks hardly affect the supply
side of new houses because they are secondary in their production, however, as the income
effect dominates they increase the demand for a given price. These demand curve shifts result
in a volatility of house prices which is twice as high as in the Davis and Heathcote (2005)
benchmark. Nevertheless, house prices are still less volatile than GDP. Lastly, the nature of the
modeled business investment adjustment costs penalize rapid changes between current and
past investment. This does not apply due the effect of land on new houses, and for this reason,
business investment lags residential investment in accordance with the data.
The second essay "The return on everything and the business cycle in production economies"
(Chapter 3), which is joint work with Christopher Heiberger and the current version of the
working paper by Fehrle and Heiberger (2020), checks the ability of RBC models to account
additionally for stylized facts which characterize asset returns based on the database from Jordà,
Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick, and Taylor (2019). The motivation for this is two-sided. On the
one hand, stochastic growth models, in particular RBC models, typically fail to reproduce the
empirically observed asset return characteristics (see e.g. Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil
(1989)). Thus, most of the RBC models which focus on housing do not consider asset return
implications. On the other hand, there is a strand of literature trying to solve asset return puzzles
inside the RBC framework. However, traditionally the approaches take only equity into account,
although housing accounts for 50 percent of an advanced economy’s total wealth. When housing
is taken into account, additional puzzles emerge, i.e. housing risk premia are only moderately
lower than equity risk premia, but the return on housing is far less volatile.
First, we show that a trade-off occurs between accounting for business cycle statistics and
for sizable risk premia when we include housing in approaches in the manner of Jermann
(1998) and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001). These approaches rely on habit formation,
adjustment costs, and partly on limited sectoral mobility. The key figure is the transformability
of consumer goods into new homes and vice versa. As long as they are easily convertible, the
household can smooth his consumption bundle over the cycle; in recessions by transforming
residential investment goods into consumption goods and vice versa in expansions. That is
because the stock of houses depreciates slowly and the elasticity of housing in utility is low. By
the same token, consumption depreciates by definition with 100 percent and its elasticity in
utility is high. This insurance option increases the willingness to take over aggregated risk to
the extent that risk premia virtually vanish. However, the option involves a pro-cyclical demand
effect for new houses, which results in a high volatility of residential investment and house
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prices as well as a positive correlation between the two. By restricting the transformability, the
household charges higher premia increase, but the models fail to account for the business cycle
statistics – both because the insurance option is no longer feasible. Hence, those approaches
cannot account for business cycle statistics and sizable risk premia at once. Additionally, all
models generally fail to account for second moments of asset return rates.
A second approach with time-varying disaster risk and Epstein-Zin preferences is more promis-
ing. Since disasters are introduced through large reductions in total factor productivity and
large depreciations of productive capital as well as residential structures, the household cannot
insure himself against disaster risk even if consumption, business and residential investment
goods are homogeneous. Thus, the model accounts for sizable risk premia. A lower elasticity
of house prices in comparison to Tobin’s ’q’ (capital prices) lowers housing premia and raises
the volatility of residential investment, both, relative to business investment. The time-varying
feature contributes to explanations for the volatility of the return on housing, of the return
on aggregated risk and the risk-free rate as well as the volatility of all quantities and house
prices relative to GDP. Further, time-varying disaster risk increases the positive correlation
between residential investment and house prices. The mechanism of the time-varying disaster
risk feature is as follows: An increase in the disaster probability increases the expectations on
future stock depreciations and decreases the expectation on future total factor productivity.
Thus, the household deinvests. Since the elasticity of house prices is lower, relative changes in
residential investment are higher than in business investment. Further, despite total productivity
remain, the demand for assets decreases, and consequently, asset prices fall. Hence, asset
quantities and prices move correlated in the absence of productivity shocks. Leverage also
helps to differentiate between the return on housing and equity and the concerning standard
deviations. Nevertheless, the volatility of the return on equity is still too low. This results in the
major drawback of the model: it cannot differentiate between the Sharp ratio of housing and
equity.
The large contribution to the business cycle of residential investment and new durables, their
high volatility, and their pro-cyclicality together in combination with the high substitutability
of such investment goods make them an interesting object of stabilizing policy. Note that in-
vestment goods have also a high intertemporal substitutability for themselves as long as the
depreciation rate is low. Thus, small changes in taxes and subsidies have a leverage effect.
Thereby, e.g. by shifting a fraction of investment activities from a potentially recovered future
into a recessive present, one can smooth the business cycle with low fiscal spending. Even a
dynamic counter-cyclical tax policy would be conceivable. However, caution is recommended.
The mechanisms in Chapter 2 and 3 imply that the residential investment behavior could be
efficient in the sense that it is first-best policy – given the states of nature. In those economies any
additional stabilizing policies would lead to losses in the household’s utility. This makes stabiliz-
ing policies more complicated than just looking for cost-effective tools which smooth pro-cyclical
and high-volatile GDP subaggregates. Having said that, there are also plausible arguments for
such fiscal stimuli, which is why the German government included a durables subsidy, i.e. a cash
for clunkers program, in their fiscal stimulus program during the Great Recession 2008 and 2009.
The third essay (Chapter 4) "Business cycle accounting for the German fiscal stimulus program
during the Great Recession", which is joint work with Johannes Huber and the current version
of the working paper by Fehrle and Huber (2020), considers the Great Recession in Germany,
the concerning stabilization policy and in particular the cash for clunkers program through the
lens of the stochastic neoclassical growth model.
The Business Cycle Accounting (BCA) framework as proposed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007) is based on the benchmark RBC model. Additionally, in nearly every market time-varying
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distortions take place. These distortions – called wedges – are modeled as taxes, stochastic
productivity or government spending. As Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) show, these
wedges are the reduced form of a broad set of frictions and market imperfections which are
mappable onto the wedges. For example a model with sticky wages is equivalent to a model with
a labor market wedge. We include wedges to the variables government consumption, durables,
investment, labor, net exports, and efficiency and show how to map the measures of the fiscal
stimulus program towards them. We further include adjustment costs to the capital stock and
the stock of durables. This avoids that the durables and the investment wedge are perfectly
correlated to prevent the counterfactual negative correlated movements of the concerning
quantities. All wedges are driven by a Markov process, commonly parameterized as a vector
autoregression (VAR) with one lag. We measure the wedges and the adjustment costs with
frequentist inference. Afterwards, we feed the measured wedges back into the model one by one,
to assess how much of movements in GDP, subaggregates and hours worked can be attributed
to the particular wedge.
Our findings suggest that the efficiency wedge drove the Great Recession in Germany. The
investment wedge and the net exports wedge contributed substantially to the crisis. The govern-
ment consumption wedge and in particular the durables wedge acted counter-cyclically. We
attribute the latter to the cash for clunkers program or more general to durables subsidies. We
conclude that this subsidy was more effective than pure government consumption, since the
effects were similar but the expenditures for the subsidies were far lower. Previous BCA applica-
tions for Germany do not differentiate between productive investment and new durables. As
their wedges affect the business cycle in different directions based on a government intervention,
they potentially underestimate financial frictions which are mappable towards the investment
wedge.
Since the application of BCA is reported to be somewhat difficult and there is no straight
methodological implementation of BCA, we describe in addition a well-performing procedure,
which we apply in this study. The procedure includes approaches which are scattered in the
literature or we developed them.
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Chapter 2
Housing and the Business Cycle revisited
— Daniel Fehrle —
The essay of Fehrle (2019) is already published as:
FEHRLE, D. (2019): “Housing and the business cycle revisited,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 99, 103–115.
Chapter 3
The return on everything and the business cycle in
production economies
— Daniel Fehrle and Christopher Heiberger—
3.1 Introduction
The seminal publications of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989) have issued a challenge
to macroeconomic models: explaining the historically observed sizeable equity premium (excess
of the return on a stock market index over the return of a relatively riskless security) together
with the low risk-free rate for a reasonable degree of risk aversion. While standard Real Business
Cycle (RBC) models are successful in accounting for important stylized facts of the business cycle,
they typically fail to reproduce the empirically observed characteristics of asset returns. Over
the past years, different approaches have been suggested by the literature in order to solve the
puzzle. To name but a few, Jermann (1998) combines modifications to the standard preference
structure with frictions in the adjustment of input factors, Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001)
add frictions in the allocation of input factors, and Gourio (2012) introduces a risk for rare but
severe economic disasters. While these models are able to replicate the empirical risk premium
on stocks, they commonly ignore an asset which, according to Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor
(2019) (JST), forms roughly 50 percent of an advanced economy’s total wealth, namely housing.
Looking at it the other way round, the RBC literature which focuses on housing generally does
not consider implications for asset returns either. In the present paper, we therefore aim to
combine the two strands of the literature with the objective to mutually explain key asset pricing
and business cycle statistics including housing.
The new database built by Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick, and Taylor (2019) (JKKST)
covers long term data on the return on equity, on the return on housing and on the return on
total wealth as well as data on government bills and bonds for 16 advanced economies. Based
on this new data, JST re-measure the return rates on a representative investor’s total portfolio
and find that the risk premium puzzle by Mehra and Prescott (1985) in fact further worsens if
attention is not restricted to equity only: the Sharpe ratio of housing is even larger than the
Sharpe ratio of equity. Their result raises three questions. First, are existing approaches capable
of explaining even larger Sharpe ratios than previously required for risky assets, second, can
return rates and volatilities of various assets be differentiated, and third, can different Sharpe
ratios between the two risky assets be matched. They show that several popular approaches
which were previously shown to be successful in reproducing the return rates on equity, turn
out less successful once the return on housing and the return on total wealth are also taken
into consideration. While the study of JST considers various different approaches including
habit formation as in Abel (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or disaster risk with and
without recursive utility as in Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), and Bansal and Yaron (2004), they
focus on endowment economies throughout.
We think that studying more general asset pricing statistics also in production economies is
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important for various reasons. First, the analysis of multiple assets asks for an explanation of
the empirically observed differences in the mean return rates, volatilities and Sharpe ratios. For
example, in the Lucas (1978) framework for asset prices, different Sharpe ratios of assets can
only be realized if the correlations of the assets’ returns with the model’s stochastic discount
factor differ. While different volatilities of returns and different correlations between return rates
and consumption growth are introduced exogenously in endowment economies, the explanation
of these features becomes an important exercise in production economies. Second, as argued by
Cochrane and Hansen (1992), any friction which can help to reproduce asset pricing statistics
may on the other hand have empirically counterfactual implications for business cycle statistics.
Hence, the effects of such frictions on both, asset prices and business cycles, should be analyzed
simultaneously within the framework of RBC models. Third, many mechanisms which can
explain risk premia in endowment economies may fail in general equilibrium since the household
can alter his plans to smooth consumption and thereby insure himself. Fourth, the business
cycle is potentially the macroeconomic phenomenon with the largest effects on asset returns.
Hence, explaining the key facts of asset return rates and the business cycle in the same internally
consistent model is important in order to gain insights into this relationship. Fifth, RBC models
are the backbone for a broader class of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models
used for stabilization policy analysis. For this purpose, an unsatisfactory performance with
regard to asset pricing statistics may constitute a significant shortcoming of these models. For
example, high risk premia may diminish investment activities even if the riskless interest rate is
low.
In our analysis we simultaneously focus on partly puzzling stylized facts of asset prices and
the business cycle. These stylized facts are identified as common features from historic data
which are valid for several developed countries over long time periods. Among the stylized
facts which characterize asset returns are: i) a stable risk-free rate smaller than 2.25 percent, ii)
return rates on equity moderately larger than returns on housing, iii) risk premia on equity, on
housing and on total risk larger than 3 percent, iv) return rates and premia on equity which are
at least twice as volatile as return rates and premia on housing and on total risk, and v) a Sharpe
ratio of housing significantly larger than the Sharpe ratio of equity. Turning to business cycle
statistics, they reveal the following important characteristics: i) residential investments are at
least moderately more volatile than business investments, ii) house prices are at least twice as
volatile as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and iii) house prices, business investments as well as
GDP are positively correlated with residential investments, and the correlation between house
prices and GDP is also positive. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) designate the ability to generate
correlated movements of subaggregates as a litmus test for RBC models.
The starting point of our analysis is a variation of the Jermann (1998) model with exogenous
labor but extended by a separate housing stock. Following Davis and Heathcote (2005), the
stock of houses differs from productive capital in two aspects. First, it enters the household’s
utility function whereas productive capital enters the production function and, second, houses
depreciate at a lower rate. While we assume the same capital adjustment costs in line with
the ’q-theory’ for business investments as in Jermann (1998), convex adjustment costs for
housing arise from the fact that new houses require that residential structures must be linked
to land. Moreover, we first assume that business investments, residential investments and
the consumption good are homogenous goods. This assumption together with the fact that
the elasticity of housing in the household’s consumption bundle as well as the depreciation
rate of houses are both small, allows the household to conveniently smooth his consumption
bundle across different states of nature through optimal adjustment of residential investments in
response to technology shocks. In consequence, risk premia in the Jermann (1998) model with
housing vanish even when large habits in consumption and housing are assumed. Nevertheless,
the model can predict a pro-cyclical demand effect for residential investments. House prices
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fluctuate more than GDP and the model reproduces the observed co-movements from the data.1
In a second step we restrain the household’s option to smooth his consumption bundle after
the shock’s realization. We consider a two sector model where residential investments are
produced in one sector whereas production of business investments and of the consumption
good takes place in a second sector. The productive capital stock is sector-specific and immobile,
and subject to adjustment costs in both sectors as in Fehrle (2019). This model can be interpreted
as a stripped down version of the multi-sectoral model by Davis and Heathcote (2005) and
is similar to the model of Nguyen (2018). Sticking at first to the assumption of exogenous
labor supply, the model can produce moderate risk premia. The model’s ability to explain
sizeable risk premia is lost once labor supply is determined endogenously, but can be recovered
if labor mobility between the sectors is limited similar to Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001).
However, the model performs worse with respect to the residential business cycle statistics
and in particular fails to generate co-moving economic activity between the two sectors. In
consequence, we conclude that the model cannot explain sizeable risk premia and the observed
co-moving economic activity simultaneously. Further, return rates turn out far too volatile in the
model. The standard deviation of the risk-free rate exceeds its empirical counterpart by a factor
of 8 while the return rates on housing and on the total portfolio are more than 4 and more than
2 times, respectively, as volatile as in the data. Moreover, the model cannot explain any of the
empirically observed differences between equity and housing.
Including housing into disaster economies turns out more promising. We consider an otherwise
standard RBC model with housing where economic disasters are introduced through large
negative shocks which reduce total factor productivity and also destroy productive capital and
residential structures to the same extent. Moreover, the model features time-varying disaster
risk and recursive preferences of the class introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989). Different
elasticities of Tobin’s q and of house prices help to explain differences in the mean and in the
volatilities between returns on unlevered equity and on housing while leverage additionally
helps to differentiate the effect. Keeping the coefficient of relative risk aversion to a moderate
level of 5.5, the model can explain a low return rate on government bonds of 1.31 percent
on average (1.57 percent in the US data) and is able to replicate an equity premium of 6.56
percent (5.88 percent in the US data). In accordance with the data, return rates on housing turn
out moderately lower than on equity and the housing premium in the model is 3.00 percent
(compared to 4.45 percent in the US data). The total risk premium in the model turns out to be
4.98 percent and closely matches the value from the data (5.27 percent in the US data). Next to
mean return rates and premia, the model can also match the low volatility of government bonds
fairly well. Time-varying disaster risk helps to increase the volatility of the risky assets’ returns
and allows to closely reproduce the standard deviations of returns and premia on housing as
well as on total risk. However, the standard deviations of returns and premia on equity remain
too small. The model can closely replicate the Sharpe ratio of housing and the Sharpe ratio of
the total portfolio from the data but does not match the significantly smaller Sharpe ratio of
equity. Although the premia and their volatilities differ between the two risky assets, the model
cannot generate different Sharpe ratios.
The disaster model is able to generate relative volatilities of business investments, residential
investments and house prices which all fit the data. Business investments are almost 3 times as
volatile as GDP, residential investments are more than twice as volatile as business investments
and house prices are almost twice as volatile as GDP. In line with Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer
(2014), we find that time-varying uncertainty is important for the latter result. The model further
reproduces the empirically observed correlation between GDP and residential investments and
between GDP and house prices. The correlations between residential investments and house
1Note that in a benchmark one sector model co-moving business and residential investments are a puzzle because
the household intends to increase productive capital first. See also Kydland, Rupert, and Sustek (2016).
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prices and between residential investments and business investments match the data in sign but
are—at odds to the data—close to one.
An earlier analysis of risk premia in a production economy with housing, habits, and adjust-
ments costs, which is similar to our extension of the Jermann (1998) model is presented in
Jaccard (2011). However, different from our work and in contrast to JKKST and Flavin and
Yamashita (2002), Jaccard (2011) considers data where the return on housing is markedly
smaller than the return on equity. His empirical targets are based on Piazzesi, Schneider, and
Tuzel (2007) who assume that the house price index grows with the price index of residential
investments, whereas Davis and Heathcote (2007) and Knoll, Schularick, and Steger (2017)
show that the main driver for increasing house prices are land prices. Moreover, different from
the present paper Jaccard (2011) does not focus on returns on total risk. Lastly, Jaccard (2011)
models superficial habits which have no intratemporal effect and the habit parameter is close to
one.2 The economic plausibility of both assumptions is questionable.
To the best of our knowledge, more general risk premia have not been investigated in produc-
tion economies with disaster risk up to this date.
Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Nieuwerburgh (2017) study a two-sector production economy
with aggregated and idiosyncratic income risk and use this framework in order to explain the
boom-bust cycle in the first decade of this century. In their model, incomplete markets produce
sizable risk premia for returns on equity and housing. While the model can match the Sharpe
ratio of equity, the mean and the standard deviation of the return on equity turn out too small.
Moreover, the return on housing is twice as large as the return on equity, which contrasts the
data. Due to heterogeneity, there is no comparable measure for the volatility of returns on
housing.
The risk usually associated with housing wealth is potentially of a more idiosyncratic nature
than the risk from equity.3 In the present paper, we do not consider such differences in the
typical nature of risks. Similarly, the models abstract from other asset specific characteristics
such as liquidity, transaction costs and search and matching frictions. Instead, we choose to
face the aggregated data from JKKST throughout with a representative agent framework with
complete markets. In this regard we understand our study as a first exploration of i) the asset
pricing and business cycle characteristics which can already be explained within an elementary
representative agent framework with complete markets, of ii) the characteristics for which such
a framework becomes insufficient, and of iii) the reasons why a more sophisticated framework
which helps to further differentiate between the assets is required for the characteristics in ii).
Concerning i) we find that the model with disaster risk allows us to generate a Sharpe ratio which
is substantially larger than the value previously confronted with for equity and which is close to
the Sharpe ratio that is observed for housing. Moreover, the model can explain different means
and volatilities of the risky assets while it still maintains a good fit to business cycle statistics.
However, in regard to ii) the main shortcoming of the framework is that it cannot generate
different Sharpe ratios of the risky assets. Different Sharpe ratios require different correlations
between premia and the stochastic discount factor. Yet, in all of the models considered in
the present paper, the return rates of the two risky assets are far too strongly correlated. We
conclude, that further adjustments which help to disentangle this correlation are necessary.
From here on the papers reads as follows. In section 3.2 we first present the stylized facts on
which we focus in the remainder of the paper. Section 3.3 presents and discusses the non-disaster
2Jaccard (2011) sets the habit parameter implicitly to one and only calibrates the habit persistence. With stationary
variables the value of the habit parameter equals the reciprocal of the growth factor (=0.995).
3While JKKST report a standard deviation of 3.38 percent for the aggregated return on housing in the US data,
Flavin and Yamashita (2002) as well as Landvoigt, Piazzesi, and Schneider (2015) find a standard deviation of
the individual’s return on housing of 14 percent. Hence, one potential approach to explain the different Sharpe
ratios between equity and housing found in the aggregated data may be the idiosyncratic nature of the risk
associated with housing.
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economies, and section 3.4 introduces and discusses the economies with disaster risk. The paper
concludes with section 3.5 and more detailed derivations are collected in the appendix.
3.2 Stylized facts
We start with the presentation of stylized facts which characterize historical data on business
cycles, housing and asset prices and which the literature has identified as key facts that are
commonly valid for most countries over longer time periods (see e.g. JKKST for asset prices
and Davis and Nieuwerburgh (2015) for housing and business cycles). In Tables 1 and 2 we
provide a summary of these stylized facts for the US (1970-2015), the UK (1969-2015), France
(1980-2015), and Japan (1963-2015) while Appendix A provides the results for additional
countries. Asset price statistics were computed from annual data from the JKKST database while
business cycle statistics are shown for quarterly data from the OECD.stats library.1.
First, the upper part of Table 3.1 displays the mean return rates on bills, on equity, on housing
and on total risk, and the standard deviations of the return rates are found in the lower part of
the table. We observe a low risk-free return rate between 0.98 percent in Japan and 2.24 percent
in France together with a low standard deviation (2.3-3.7). Note, however, that bills are not
totally risk-free and, hence, only provide an upper bound proxy for the true risk-free return rate.
The return on equity is between 5.86 percent in Japan and 9.61 percent in France and leads to
equity premia between 4.88 percent and 7.37 percent. In all countries, the average return on
housing turns out moderately smaller than the average return on equity, and housing premia
between 3.54 percent in France and 5.44 percent in the UK can be observed. The difference
between the two risky returns/premia is the smallest in Japan with just 0.32 percentage-points
and the largest in France with 3.83 percentage-points. For the US and the UK the differences are
1.43 percentage-points and 1.00 percentage-points, respectively.4 Moreover, in the US and the
UK the return on total risk is approximately the average of the two risky return rates. In France
the return on total risk is close to the smaller return on housing while in Japan the return on
total risk exceeds the decomposed return rates on both risky assets.
While equity shows moderately larger returns than housing, on the downside the return rates
on equity are two to four times as volatile as the return rates on housing. Both risky returns are
least volatile in the US with standard deviations of 16.7 and 3.78, respectively, while the largest
standard deviations are observed in France (24.11) for equity and in the UK (9.65) for housing.
In all countries, the standard deviation of returns on total risk is also significantly lower than the
standard deviation of returns on equity, and premia are almost identically as volatile as return
rates. Finally, in all countries the Sharpe ratio of housing exceeds the Sharpe ratio of equity
significantly, and the Sharpe ratio of total risk is close to the Sharpe ratio of housing. Summing
up, we observe the following characteristics for return rates: i) a risk-free rate in the range of
1-2.2 percent together with a low volatility, ii) return rates on equity moderately larger than
returns on housing, iii) premia on risky returns over 3 percent, iii) return rates and premia on
equity which are at least twice as volatile as return rates and premia on housing and on total
risk, and iv) a Sharpe ratio of housing significantly larger than the Sharpe ratio of equity and
similar to the Sharpe ratio of total risk.
Second, Table 3.2 shows the stylized facts from the housing and the business cycle literature.
We observe that GDP has a standard deviation of approximately 1.5-1.6 percent in the US, the
UK and Japan while its standard deviation is slightly below 1 percent in France. In the US and
the UK residential investments are twice as volatile as business investments while the difference
4The difference between the return rates in France is closer to the value in the other countries in the time periods
chosen by JST (1963-2015 and 1870-2015). Our French data set starts in 1980 due to missing data for the
business cycle statistics.
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Table 3.1: Returns, premiums and second moments
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P SRE SRH SRT
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27 0.36 1.01 0.75
UK 8.00 7.00 7.47 1.56 6.44 5.44 5.91 0.27 0.61 0.69
FRA 9.61 5.78 6.61 2.24 7.37 3.54 4.37 0.31 0.57 0.59
JPA 5.86 5.54 6.19 0.98 4.88 4.56 5.21 0.24 0.7 0.65
σ(RE) σ(RH) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.90 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
UK 23.41 9.64 8.44 3.73 24.27 8.88 8.62
FRA 24.11 5.52 6.95 2.55 23.98 6.18 7.39
JPA 20.15 6.53 8.10 2.53 19.94 6.47 8.03
Notes: Mean percentage returns on equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ) as well as the
equity premium (EP), the housing premium (HP), and the total risk premium (T P). The corresponding standard
deviations σ(X ) as well as the Sharpe ratios of equity (SRE), of housing (SRH) and of total risk (SRT ). Periods:
USA 1970-2015, United Kingdom 1969-2015, France 1980-2015, and Japan 1963-2015. Data from JKKST, own
calculations.















USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.64
UK 1.58 2.68 5.56 4.85 0.51 0.16 0.69 0.71
FRA 0.95 2.75 3.17 3.19 0.65 0.64 0.81 0.48
JPA 1.59 2.41 3.84 2.70 0.31 0.27 0.45 0.55
Notes: Business cycle statistics are from quarterly logged per capita hp-filtered (1600) data. σx is the standard
deviation of x , r xy the correlation between x and y . RESI=residential investment, BUSI=non-residential investment,
Ph house prices. Periods: USA: 1970-2015, , United Kingdom 1969-2015, France 1980-2015 Japan 1963-2015.
Data: See Appendix 3.A, own calculations.
between the two volatilities is moderately smaller in Japan and significantly smaller in France.5
In all four countries the standard deviation of business investment lies between 2.4 and 2.9
percent and house prices are pro-cyclical. GDP, house prices, residential and business investment
co-move and the lowest correlation is observed between business and residential investments. In
short, sub-aggregates and house prices co-move pro-cyclically. Usually the literature additionally
considers lagged cross-correlations with residential investments since residential investments
lead the business cycle in the US. However, Kydland, Rupert, and Sustek (2016) show that this
fact is unique to the US and Canada which is why we omit lead-lag-patterns here.
Next to the four countries discussed in this section, Appendix 3.A shows that we also observe
the same stylized facts in most other countries.
3.3 Economies with non-disaster risk
In this section, we add housing to influential approaches to explain the equity premium puzzle
in production economies. We start with an adaption of the Jermann (1998) model with habit
formation and capital adjustment costs in line with the ’q’ theory (model A). We then extend
the model by housing (model B). In a next step, we separate the production of residential
investments from the production of the consumption good and business investments. The two
sectors are subject to limited sectoral capital mobility similar to Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(2001) and Fehrle (2019). We consider the cases of exogenous labor (model C), endogenous and
5For most continental European countries we observe the same relation as in France.
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fully mobile labor (model D), and endogenous labor subject to limited sectoral labor mobility
(model E).
3.3.1 Housing with Jermann (1998)
Model A: Our study starts with the seminal work of Jermann (1998) with habits in utility,
adjustment costs in capital and exogenous labor decisions. Our variation of the model deviates
from its original treatment only in that we consider exogenous habits that are out of the
household’s control.
Model B: We proceed to extend the Jermann (1998) model by housing. The household draws
utility from housing Ht and consumption Ct , and both are subject to habit formation. Habits
Xht , X ∈ {C , H}, are exogenous and evolve according to Xht = χX X t−1. Labor supply remains
exogenous. Output Yt is produced with capital Kt and is subject to labor augmenting technical
progress growing at the rate ay in the long run, and to productivity shocks Zt following an
AR(1)-process, ln Zt+1 = ρy ln Zt + εt+1, εt ∼ iidN(0,σ2y). Consumption, business investment It ,
and residential investment Dt are homogeneous goods. We stick to the assumption of capital
adjustment costs as in Jermann (1998).6 A fixed factor normalized to one, namely land, affects
the transformation from residential investment to new houses. The planner’s problem in a
centralized economy therefore reads as follows:7
max






((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh)1−η − 1
1−η ,





Yt = Ct + It + Dt ,






Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt ,
(3.3.1)
whereη,αy , ay ,µc,µh > 0, µc+µh = 1, 0< β ,δk,δh < 1, andΦ(x) :=
ϕ1
1−κ x
1−κ+ϕ2, ϕ1 > 0, ϕ2 ∈ R.
We follow Davis and Heathcote (2005) and define GDP by GDPt = Yt + MRSH,Ct Ht , where
MRSH,Ct = (µh/µc)(Ct − Cht)/(Ht − Hht) denotes the marginal rate of substitution between
housing and consumption so that its product with the current housing stock yields the implicit
rent from housing. Finally, the return rate RE,t+1 on investment in productive capital, the return
rate RH,t+1 on housing, the return rate RT,t+1 on total risk, and the risk-free rate R f ,t are given by
1+ RE,t+1 =














αYt+1 − It+1 + qt+1Kt+2 + (MRSH,Ct+1 + (1−δh)Pht+1)Ht+1
qt Kt+1 + Pht+1Ht+1
,
6In an earlier version of the paper we assumed investment adjustment costs as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005). Fehrle (2019) shows for the Davis and Heathcote (2005) framework that these adjustment costs
account better for the lag pattern of business investment. However, to remain in line with Jermann (1998),
Gourio (2012) and our disaster risk framework, we changed to capital adjustment costs. Besides the lead-lag
structure, which is beyond the scope, changes are minor.
7See Appendix 3.C for details.
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where qt = 1/Φ′(It/Kt) is Tobin’s q, rt = αy(Yt/Kt) is the rental rate of capital which equals the
marginal product of capital, Λt = µc(Ct − Cht)µc(1−η)−1(Ht − Hht)µh(1−η) is the marginal utility
of consumption and Pht = D
φ
t /(1−φ) denotes house prices which equal the reciprocal of the
residential investment’s marginal rate of production of new houses.
Calibration A: We identify one period in the model with one quarter in the data and closely
follow the calibration in Jermann (1998). More precisely, we set the coefficient of relative risk
aversion to η = 5, the elasticity of capital in the production function to αy = 0.36 and the
quarterly trend growth rate to ay = 1.005 as in Jermann (1998). We slightly deviate from the
value of δk = 0.025 used in Jermann (1998) and, in foresight of model B, instead adjust the
depreciation rate of capital from Nguyen (2018), who strips down the Davis and Heathcote
(2005) model, to quarterly data which yields δk = 0.022. The autocorrelation parameter and
the conditional standard deviation of the AR(1)-process governing productivity are pinned down
to ρy=0.95 and σy=0.01. In line with Jermann (1998), we choose the remaining parameters
of the model, i.e. the household’s time preference β , the habit parameter χc, and the parameter
κ controlling the elasticity of the investment capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s q, in such
way to closely replicate the risk-free rate, the equity premium and the relative volatility of
business investment to GDP from the US data. We minimize the (unweighted) sum of squared
deviations between the targets in the model and the values in the data over a grid covering
β? := βa1−ηy ∈ [0.99; 0.999],χc ∈ [0; 0.95] and κ ∈ [0; 6.25] where the number of grid-point is
10, 10 and 50, respectively. The resulting values are summarized in Column A of Table 3.3.
Calibration B: In order to keep the different variations of the model comparable and in order
to emphasize the effects of introducing housing into the Jermann (1998) model, all parameters
from model A also remain at the same values in model B.8 In particular, we do not re-optimize
the previously ”free” parameters for model B in order to match the (additionally available)
targets. However, re-optimizing would not change the following main results.
We calibrate the additional parameters from housing in model B as follows. First, we also
borrow the depreciation rate of housing δh = 0.009 from the same source as we did δk. Second,
we follow Grossmann, Larin, Löfflad, and Steger (2019) and pin down the weights µc and µh of
consumption and of housing in the consumption bundle such way that the ratio of expenditures
on housing to total consumption is 19 percent on the balanced growth path and so that µc+µh = 1
holds. Third, the habit parameter for housing is set to the same high value of χh = 0.95 as
for consumption. Finally, we take the value of the land parameter φ = 0.106 from Davis and
Heathcote (2005).
Results: The return rates as well as the business cycle statistics for our variation of the Jermann
(1998) model (row A) and for the model extended by housing (row B) are summarized in
tables 3.4 and 3.5. We compute the annualized mean return rates and the annualized standard
deviation of return rates from a simulation of 100,000 periods. The second moments of the
business cycle are reported as the average outcome from 100 repeated simulations of HP-filtered
time series of the model’s equilibrium outcomes, each for 180 periods. The model solution is
obtained from a second-order perturbation method.
First, as shown by Jermann (1998), model A is able to generate a sizeable equity premium
and a risk-free rate which are close to the values observed in the data. Moreover, we can also
closely replicate the volatility of business investments relative to the volatility of GDP. On the
other hand, the return rates, especially the risk-free rate, turn out too volatile in the model.
However, once housing is introduced into the model, all risk premia—on equity, housing
8Note however, that η now is the coefficient of relative risk aversion with respect to the composite good and no
longer with respect to consumption only. Moreover, now β? := βa(µc+(1−φ)µh)(1−η).
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Table 3.3: Calibration
A B C D / E Description
β? 0.994 0.994 0.999 0.999 discount factor
η 5 5 5 5 coefficient of relative risk aversion
µ∗)c – 0.81 0.81 0.53 weight of consumption in composite good
µ
∗)
h – 0.19 0.19 0.12 weight of housing in composite good
χc 0.95 0.95 0.825 0.825 habit parameter of consumption
χh – 0.95 0.825 0.825 habit parameter of housing
χn – – – 0.95 habit parameter of leisure
ay 1.005 1.005 1.005 1.005 growth rate (y sector)
ad – – 1.002 1.002 growth rate (d sector)
φ – 0.106 0.106 0.106 share of land in housing
αy 0.36 0.36 0.25 0.25 capital share in production (y sector)
αd – – 0.20 0.20 capital share in production (d sector)
κy 4.05 4.05 6.25 6.25 elasticity of Tobin’s q (y sector)
κd – – 1.25 1.25 elasticity of Tobin’s q (d sector)
δk 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 rate of capital depreciation (y sector)
δh – 0.009 0.009 0.009 rate of housing depreciation (d sector)
σy 0.01 0.01 0.0094 0.0094 conditional standard deviation of log TFP (y sector)
ρy 0.95 0.95 0.966 0.966 autocorrelation of log TFP (y sector)
σd – – 0.0172 0.0172 conditional standard deviation of log TFP (d sector)
ρd – – 0.923 0.923 autocorrelation of log TFP (d sector)
Notes: ∗) Endogenous by the model. A: Jermann (1998) adaption. B. A + Housing in utility. C. B + two sectors.
D: C + endogenous labor. E: D + limited sectoral labor mobility.
and total risk—turn out close to zero, and the volatility of return rates is reduced drastically.
Introducing housing into the model provides the household with an option to better insure
against fluctuations in his marginal utility in the same way as discussed by Uhlig (2007) for
endogenous labor decisions. Since consumption and residential investment are homogeneous,
the household is now able to reduce residential investments in favor of consumption in response
to negative productivity shocks. The relatively small elasticity (µh = 0.14) combined with a
small depreciation rate of housing (δh = 0.009) favor the household’s possibilities to smooth
his consumption bundle across states with different realizations of the shock. In consequence,
the stochastic discount factor becomes far less volatile so that risk premia almost disappear.
Moreover, the household’s efforts to smooth his consumption bundle by adequately adjusting
residential investment and consumption also show up in the second moments of the business
cycle. The volatility of residential investment in the model is twice as large as in the data and the
demand of residential goods moves procyclical. Further, residential investments are positively
correlated with house prices and the other variables considered.
3.3.2 Moving to Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001)
Sectoral frictions with exogenous labor supply: In the previous subsection, the household
can nearly perfectly hedge against consumption fluctuations since the marginal rate of trans-
formation between residential investment and consumption was one. We restrict this option
in the following by moving to a two-sector model—separating production of the residential
good from production of the consumption good—with frictions in factor mobility. In particular,
capital is assumed immobile between the two sectors. The resulting model is similar to Nguyen
(2018). We start with exogenous labor supply before discussing the effects of endogenous labor
supply and labor supply which is contracted sector-specifically one period ahead as proposed by
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001).
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Table 3.4: Returns, premiums and second moments
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P SRE SRH SRT
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27 0.36 1.01 0.75
Model
A 7.66 – – 1.55 6.05 – – 0.25 – –
B 4.61 4.39 4.52 4.26 0.34 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.07
C 4.71 4.45 4.56 0.38 4.31 4.06 4.16 0.21 0.21 0.21
D 2.57 2.47 2.51 2.05 0.51 0.42 0.46 0.07 0.07 0.07
E 4.88 4.61 4.72 1.50 3.34 3.07 3.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
σ(RE) σ(RH) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.9 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
Model
A 25.17 – – 6.19 24.22 – –
B 5.01 2.07 3.79 0.73 4.95 1.93 3.71
C 21.83 20.73 21.19 8.08 20.26 19.06 19.57
D 7.18 5.95 6.44 1.47 7.03 5.76 6.27
E 22.60 21.45 21.92 13.39 18.19 16.72 17.33
Notes: Mean percentage returns on equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ), as well as the
equity premium (EP), the housing premium (HP), and the total risk premium (T P). The corresponding standard
deviations σ(X ) as well as the Sharpe ratios of equity (SRE), of housing (SRH) and of total risk (SRT ). We employ
a second order perturbation and simulated time series with 100,000 periods. A: Jermann (1998) adaption. B: A +
Housing. C: B + two sectors. D: C + endogenous labor. E: D + limited sectoral labor mobility.
Model C: The household’s utility and the law of motion of the housing stock remain the same
as in (3.3.1). The model economy consists of two sectors indexed by y and d. The sector
y produces a homogeneous consumption and business investment good while the residential
investment good is produced in sector d. Sector-specific technical progress grows at the rate ax in
sector x , x ∈ {y, d}, and both sectors are subject to sector-specific and uncorrelated productivity
shocks Zx t governed by AR(1)-processes, ln Zx ,t+1 = ρx ln Zx ,t + εx ,t+1, εx ,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2x). The
household is confronted with capital adjustment costs in both sectors and, once installed, capital
















USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.64
Model
A 1.25 2.91 – – – – – –
B 0.96 0.74 11.63 1.16 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.96
C 2.27 1.04 0.96 4.42 −0.03 0.00 0.08 0.97
D 1.45 0.69 4.25 2.37 0.65 0.77 0.85 0.90
E 1.96 0.96 2.10 3.97 −0.06 0.08 0.36 0.89
Notes: σx is the standard deviation of x , r
x
y the correlation between x and y. Business cycle statistics from
HP-filtered (1600) times series. We employ a second order perturbation and report the average outcomes from
repeated simulations with 180 periods. A: Jermann (1998) adaption. B: A + Housing. C: B + two sectors. D: C +
endogenous labor. E: D + limited sectoral labor mobility.
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is totally immobile. The household’s problem in a centralized economy reads as follows:
max






((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh)1−η − 1
1−η ,
s.t. Yt = ay
(1−αy )t Zy t K
αy
y t ,
Yt = Ct + It ,
Dt = ad
(1−αd )t Zd t K
αd
d t ,
It = Id t + I y t ,












Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt .
(3.3.2)
where η,αy ,αd , ay , ad ,µc,µh > 0, µc +µh = 1, β ,δk,δh ∈ (0, 1), Φy(x) = ϕy,2+ ϕy,11−κy x1−κy , and
Φd analogously.
GDP is now defined by GDPt = Yt + Pd t Dt + MRSH,Ct Ht where Pd t is the relative price of
residential investment goods. The return on housing remains the same as before but with
Pht = Pd t D
φ
t /(1−φ), while the return on equity is the weighted sum of the return on capital in
the two sectors, i.e. with the obvious adaption of notation from the one-sector model
1+ RE,t+1 =
αy Yt+1 − I y,t+1 + qy,t+1Ky,t+2 +αd Pd,t+1Dt+1 − Id,t+1 + qd,t+1Kd,t+2
qy,t Ky,t+1 + qd,t Kd,t+1
.
The return on total risk is adjusted in an analogous way.
Calibration: The parameters η,φ,δk and δh remain at the same values they were previously set
to in model B. Likewise, the weights µc and µh of consumption and housing in the household’s
utility are still pinned down by imposing that the ratio of expenditures on housing to total
consumption is 19 percent on the balanced growth path. In order to take the two sector
framework into account, we assume the same capital shares, αy and αd , as in Nguyen (2018).
Moreover, we also take the autocorrelation parameters ρy and ρd of shocks to productivity
in both sectors from Nguyen (2018). The standard deviations of innovations are chosen in
such way that their ratio is kept the same as in Nguyen (2018) while the level is adjusted to
reproduce a standard deviation of GDP comparable to models A and B and to the data. As
already noted, we abstract from technology spillovers.9 While Nguyen (2018) does not consider
long-run growth, we choose ay = 1.005 and ad = 1.002 to match the annual output growth
rates in the two sectors as reported by Davis and Heathcote (2005).
The remaining parameters are set again in such way that the (unweighted) sum of squared
deviations between our targets in the model and in the data is minimized. The list of targets
now includes the risk-free rate, the equity premium, the housing premium as well as the
relative standard deviations and the correlations from the business cycle statistics in Table
3.2, all for US data. Our grid covers β? := βa(µc+(1−φ)µhαd )(1−η)y a
(1−φ)(1−αd )µh(1−η)
d ∈ [0.99, 0.999],
χc,χh ∈ [0.7, 0.95], and κy ,κd ∈ [0.625, 6.25] and is built-up from 10×5×5×10×10 grid-points.
A summary of the model’s calibration is given in column C of Table 3.3.
Results: The return rates and business cycle statistics in the two-sector model are shown in
row C of tables 3.4 and 3.5. First, restricting the household’s option to smooth his consumption
9Spillovers in Nguyen (2018) are negligible. Fehrle (2019) makes the case for preventing spill-overs and correlated
shocks.
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bundle by switching from residential investments to consumption has the desired effect on asset
prices. Compared to model B, risk premia in the model again increase substantially. The model
generates an equity premium of 4.31 percent which is about one and a half percentage-points
below the value found in the data while the premium on housing in the model is moderately
lower at 4.06 percent and is a half percentage-point below its empirical counterpart. Similar
to the empirical findings, the model yields a premium of total risk in between the two premia
of equity and housing. The model also reproduces a low risk-free rate but fails to explain the
observed volatilities of asset prices. The standard deviation of the risk-free rate exceeds its
empirical value by a factor of four, return rates on housing turn out too volatile by a factor of
almost six, and the volatility of returns on total risk is too large by a factor of almost three. The
model, hence, cannot explain a Sharpe ratio of housing which is markedly larger than that of
equity.
The restriction of the household’s option in the allocation between consumption and residential
investments has a negative effect on the business cycle statistics. While in model B the household’s
preference to smooth the consumption bundle induces procyclical co-movement in the demand
of residential goods, the positive correlation between house prices and residential investment
now disappears. Moreover, the assumption of uncorrelated shocks in the two sectors prevents
co-movements between residential and business investment. Since consumption and business
investments account for the largest part of GDP, residential investments and GDP fluctuate
almost uncorrelatedly.
Endogenous labor supply: Allowing the household to adjust labor supply in response to
productivity shocks, again opens a channel which admits to smooth the consumption bundle
more evenly across different states of shocks. As pointed out by Uhlig (2007), risk premia in the
model should suffer.
Model D: Hours worked in the two sectors, Ny t and Nd t , augment the production functions and
aggregated hours Nt = Nd t + Ny t cannot exceed the time endowment of the household which
is normalized to one. Accordingly, leisure (1− Nt) is added to the household’s utility function
which is parameterized as in Davis and Heathcote (2005) but extended by habit formation in
leisure equivalent to consumption and housing, i.e. Nht := 1−χn(1− Nt−1). The changes to the
household’s problem from (3.3.2) are as follows
max






((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh((1− Nt)− (1− Nht))µn)1−η − 1
1−η ,






Yt = Ct + It ,










where now µc,µh,µn > 0, µc +µh +µn = 1.
Calibration: Again, in order to place emphasis on the effects of introducing endogenous labor
decisions to the model, all parameters from model C remain at the same values as before. We
only adjust the weights µc,µh and µn in the household’s utility in such way that i) the housing
expenditures remain at 19 percent of total consumption expenditures and ii) he works one third
of his time endowment on average. Moreover, the habit parameter χn is set to its upper bound
0.95 of plausible values. Column D/E of Table 3.3 outlines the calibration.
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Results: Row D of Table 3.4 confirms the already expected consequences of endogenous labor
supply for the return rates in the model. Compared to model C, the return rates on equity,
housing, and total risk, decrease and become significantly less volatile. In consequence, risk
premia drastically fall by a magnitude of order.
Endogenous labor supply reintroduces the possibility for adjustments in the allocation of
the consumption bundle after the shock’s realization. The household is able to adjust his
working hours intersectorally and can shift conveniently between consumption and residential
investments. In consequence, the discussed demand effect for residential investment recurs as
can be seen in row D of Table 3.5. The model can explain the volatilities of residential investment
and house prices fairly well while business investment remains too involatile. Moreover, the
model can also generate the positive correlations between house prices, residential investment,
and GDP found in the data. Yet, residential and business investment are correlated too strongly.
Limited labor mobility: Two well-known extensions that help to revive risk premia when
labor decisions are endogenous are limited sectoral mobility as described by Boldrin, Christiano,
and Fisher (2001) and wage rigidities as proposed by Uhlig (2007). To keep in line with the
present framework of limited factor mobility, we focus on the former.
Model E: The household is now unable to adapt his labor supply in response to technology
shocks but is committed to working hours that are contracted sector-specifically one period
ahead. Nothing else changes so that the household’s problem remains as in (3.3.3) with the
exception that he now optimizes with regard to Nyt+1 and Ndt+1 while taking Nyt and Ndt as
given in any period t.
Calibration: We stick to the calibration in column D/E of Table 3.3 from the previous model D
with a frictionless labor market.
Results: Return rates from the two-sector model with limited labor mobility are summarized
in row E of Table 3.4. Limited labor mobility provides a mixture of the two previous cases with
exogenous labor supply in model C and with endogenous and frictionless labor supply in model
D. Hence, risk premia increase significantly compared to model D but remain below the values
from model C. Moreover, the standard deviation of the risk-free rate turns out too large by a
factor of almost six and the return rates on housing and on total risk are more than three times
too volatile.
Table 3.5 shows in its row E that the model can generate positive correlations between business
and residential investment, between GDP and residential investment and between GDP and
house prices which are all close to the values in the data. However, the attempt to explain risk
premia by shutting down the channel that enables the household to smooth his consumption
bundle comes at the cost of too involatile residential investment which is no longer positively
correlated with house prices.
3.3.3 Summary and discussion
In the classic Jermann (1998) model, habits increase the household’s desire to smooth con-
sumption of the composite good. However, if the model is extended by housing in a one sector
framework, optimal adjustment of the allocation of output to consumption and residential
investment enables the household to insure himself more conveniently against fluctuations
in the consumption bundle. A small elasticity of housing in the consumption bundle and the
rather small depreciation rate of housing favor the behavior. A similar argument holds in a
multi-sector framework with perfect labor markets where the household can adapt the allocation
of hours worked in each sector in response to productivity shocks. While this option implies
that the marginal utility does not fluctuate enough between different realizations of the shock
and therefore yields risk premia close to zero, it induces, on the other hand, a demand effect
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4 SRE SRH rM ,EP rM ,HP rEP,HP
Data
USA – 0.36 1.01 – – 0.19
Model
B 0.07 0.07 0.07 −0.99 −0.99 1.00
C 0.23 0.21 0.21 −0.92 −0.92 1.00
D 0.08 0.07 0.07 −0.98 −0.96 0.99
E 0.23 0.18 0.18 −0.80 −0.80 1.00
Notes: SRE : annualized Sharpe ratio of equity, SRH : annualized Sharpe ratio of housing, rX ,Y : correlation
between variables X and Y where Mt+1 : stochastic discount factor, EPt+1 := RE,t+1 −R f ,t : ex-post equity premium,
HPt+1 := RH,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post housing premium.
which results in positive correlations between residential investment and house prices and in
standard deviations in business cycle statistics that are close to the data.
Risk premia can be increased through sectoral frictions as e.g. limited capital and labor mobility.
Yet, this comes at the cost of losing the empirical co-movements of residential investment.
Therefore, we conclude that the present framework cannot simultaneously reproduce asset
pricing statistics and business cycle statistics as observed in the data. Moreover, the models fail
to explain the different volatilities and Sharpe ratios between the two risky assets throughout.
In all models and contrary to the data, the mean as well as the standard deviation of returns on
total risk are the weighted averages from the returns on equity and housing.
In order to provide some additional reasoning for the models’ failures in regard to asset price








Mt+1(RH,t+1 − R f ,t)

= 0,
where Mt+1 denotes the models’ respective stochastic discount factor. Taking unconditional
expectations, the equality also holds unconditionally for the models’ stationary distributions.
Hence, for both assets X ∈ {E, H},
E [Mt+1]E

RX ,t+1 − R f ,t

= −Cov Mt+1, RX ,t+1 − R f ,t

=


























Mt+1, RX ,t+1 − R f ,t

. (3.3.4)
The first factor on the right hand side defines an upper bound and is common to both assets,
while different correlations between risk premia and the stochastic discount factor between the
two assets are necessary in order to explain different Sharpe ratios. More precisely, in order
to match the different Sharpe ratios observed in the data, the correlation between premia on
housing and the stochastic discount factor must be (in absolute value) approximately 3 times as
large as the correlation between premia on equity and the stochastic discount.
We summarize the decomposition of the Sharpe ratios provided by equation (3.3.4) in Table
3.6. First, we observe that in all models the two risky return rates are almost perfectly correlated
and, hence, the correlations with the stochastic discount factor are nearly identical. By (3.3.4),
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the Sharpe ratios of the two risky assets must also coincide. Although models C and E can
replicate the empirically observed Sharpe ratio of equity fairly well, we can conclude that they
achieve this result in an unfitting way. In order to leave room for a significantly larger Sharpe
ratio of housing, the correlation between the stochastic discount factor and the premia on equity
would have to be substantially smaller (in absolute value). The smaller correlation rM ,EP would
then have to be offset with a larger standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor to keep
the equity premium and its volatility the same, and less volatile premia on housing would
be necessary in order to still match their mean. The models B and D, which fail to generate
sizeable risk premia and Sharpe ratios, suffer from a too low volatility of the stochastic discount
factor—the agent can adjust his decisions sufficiently well in response to shocks in order to keep
fluctuations in his marginal utility small.
Moreover, the nearly perfect correlation between the return rates of the two risky assets also
implies that the mean and the standard deviation of the total portfolio are the weighted averages
of the two assets. Contrary to the observations from the stylized facts, the Sharpe ratio of total
risk must coincide with the Sharpe ratios of the two risky assets.10
Fehrle (2019) discusses the implications of a larger share of land in the production of new
houses. He shows that in the in the Davis and Heathcote (2005) framework the ability to account
for co-moving economic activity, especially for the correlation between residential investment
and house prices, can be improved. We follow Fehrle (2019) and repeat our computations for
φ = 0.3 which is the upper bound considered by Fehrle (2019). The results are summarized in
Appendix 3.B.11 We find that improvements in the business cycle statistics are only marginal
and effects on asset return statistics are ambiguous.
3.4 Housing with disaster risk
In this section we move to another popular approach to explain risk premia. We combine an
otherwise standard RBC model with housing and with key elements from the literature on
economic disasters. The model is based on Gourio (2012). It is extended by housing and
features a time-varying risk for disasters which reduce productivity and which also partly destroy
the stocks of productive capital and residential structures. We choose to keep the model as
simple as possible and provide easily traceable insights of the model’s mechanisms instead of
a richer framework that would supply more degrees of freedom to match the data. A more
detailed presentation of the model, including our solution method, is delegated to Appendix
3.D.
3.4.1 Model
The basic framework of the model follows the one-sector model from the previous section.
The household derives utility from a composite good C̃t that is represented by a Cobb-Douglas
10For any non-stochastic share w ∈ (0, 1) of equity in total wealth, if rEP,HP = 1, then
σ(T P) = (w2σ2(EP) + (1−w)2σ2(HP) + 2w(1−w)rEP,HPσ(EP)σ(HP))
1
2 = wσ(EP) + (1−w)σ(HP),
and, if additionally SRE = SRH , then also
SRT =
wσ(EP)
wσ(EP) + (1−w)σ(HP)SRE +
(1−w)σ(HP)
wσ(EP) + (1−w)σ(HP)SRH = SRE = SRH .
11Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Nieuwerburgh (2017) proceed similarly by setting the land share equal 0.25.
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t (1− Nt)1−µc−µh .
We assume that the household’s preferences over streams of the composite good are described
















where ψ is the household’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and γ is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion (RRA). Note however that γ and ψ describe the household’s RRA
and EIS with respect to the composite good C̃ . Since the composite good aggregator is of the
Cobb-Douglas type, the consumption-based RRA is given by µcγ and the consumption-based
EIS reads 11−µc(1−1/ψ) .
12 For easier notation we define Vt := Ṽ
1−1/ψ
t which satisfies the recursion
Vt = (1− β)C̃
1− 1ψ





where we use, similar to Caldara, Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez, and Yao (2012), the
notation
θ := 1− 1− γ
1− 1ψ
.
In the case where θ = 0, the RRA equals the reciprocal of the EIS and the household’s utility
reduces to the ‘classical’ expected discounted sum of within period CRRA utilities. Hence, θ can
also be interpreted as the deviation from this ‘classic’ case.
Output Yt is produced with the help of capital Kt and labor Nt according to the Cobb-Douglas
production function Yt = Kαt (At Nt)
1−α where At denotes labor augmenting technological progress
which grows stochastically as will be outlined below. We stick to the assumption that investments
in the productive capital stock are met with adjustment costs as in Jermann (1998). Output is
allocated between the homogenous goods consumption, business investments, and investments
in residential structures. Residential structures must be combined with land, which acts as
adjustment costs to residential investments, before entering the stock of houses.
Additionally, the economy faces a great disaster risk. Disasters are introduced through an
exogenous shock in form of a binary variable bt which indicates disasters in case of bt = 1 while
bt = 0 in normal times. Following Gourio (2012), disasters appear with time-varying probability
and size. More specifically, we assume that
P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 0) =min{pt , 1}, P(bt+1 = 0|bt = 0) = 1−min{pt , 1}
where the log of pt follows an AR(1)-process
ln pt+1 = (1−ρp) ln p̄+ρp ln pt + εp,t+1, εp,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2p). (3.4.1)
Additionally, disasters remain persistent with probability no less than q ∈ (0,1) so that
P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 1) =max{q,min{pt , 1}}, P(bt+1 = 0|bt = 1) = 1−max{q, min{pt , 1}}.
12See also Swanson (2012) and Heiberger and Ruf (2019).
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On the one hand, disasters result in a decline of productivity by the factor 1 − eωt+1 so that
technology grows stochastically according to
At+1 = At ae
zt+1+ωt+1 bt+1 ,
zt+1 = ρzzt + εz,t+1, εz,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2z ).
On the other hand, disasters also result in the destruction of a fraction 1− eωt+1 of the stocks of
























Finally, the disaster size 1− eωt+1 also evolves stochastically according to
ωt := ω̄e
ω̂t ,







where ω̄ < 0. We slightly deviate from the treatment in Gourio (2012) in the specification of the
process governing the disaster size and allow autocorrelation but restrict outcomes to ωt < 0 so
that disasters always have negative effects. The specification is similar to Fernández-Villaverde
and Levintal (2018).13
Summing up, the household’s problem in a centralized economy reads as follows
max/min





Vt = (1− β)C̃
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Dt , It ≥ 0,
(3.4.3)
where K∗t+1 and H
∗
t+1 is the size of the stocks before bt+1 realizes and Φ remains defined as
before. We define GDP again as the sum of consumption, both investment types and the implicit
rent from housing.
Return Rates and Leverage The return rates on equity, housing and total risk are defined by
(see also Gourio (2012) and Heiberger (2018)):
1+ RE,t+1 = e
bt+1ωt+1











13Gourio (2012) additionally considers a transitory component of disasters. We checked the effects of a transitory
shock component as well. Since we find that the effects for our targets are marginal, we omit the transitory
component for the sake of simplicity.
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where rt = α(Yt/Kt), Wt = (1−α)(Yt/Nt), qt = 1/Φ′(It/Kt) and MRSH,Ct = (µh/µc)(Ct/Ht) are
the marginal product of capital, the real wage rate, Tobin’s q and the marginal rate of substitution
between housing and consumption, respectively. Moreover, the risk-free rate satisfies
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However, R f ,t is the return rate of a real risk-free government bond which, as already noted,
does not have an equivalent empirical counterpart. We therefore follow Barro (2006) and
Gourio (2012) and assume that bonds in the model may also default during disasters. More
concretely, we consider government (gb), corporate (cb) and housing (hb) bonds which differ
by their recovery rates Γx ,t during disasters, x ∈ {gb, cb,hb}. The price Q(Tx )x ,t of such a bond with
bond specific maturity Tx then satisfies the recursion
Q(Tx )x ,t = Et[Mt+1
 
1− bt+1 + bt+1Γx ,t+1

Q(Tx−1)x ,t+1 ], where Q
(0)
x ,t+1 ≡ 1.
The ex-post return rates from holding bonds with maturity Tx for one period are defined by
1+ R(Tx )x ,t+1 :=
 





We assume that the rates at which bonds default during disasters are coupled to the disaster
size 1− eωt+1 via constant fractions χx ∈ [0, 1] so that
Γx ,t+1 = 1−χx(1− eωt+1).
Finally, since the return on equity in the data is calculated from stock returns, it includes
leverage. This does not hold for housing returns. To be in line with the data, we also consider
leveraged return rates in the model. More precisely, we assume that in each period the constant
fraction mcb ∈ [0, 1) of the firm’s capital stock is financed by debt through bonds which all have
maturity Tcb. Since the Modigliani and Miller theorem holds, the leveraged return rate on equity
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Table 3.7: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.995 discount factor
ψ 2 elasticity of intertemporal substitution
γ 5.5 coefficient of relative risk aversion
µ∗)c 0.30 weight of consumption in composite good
µ
∗)
h 0.07 weight of housing in composite good
α 0.36 capital share in production
φ 0.30 share of land in housing
κ 0.80 elasticity of Tobin’s q wrt. investment-capital ratio
δk 0.022 rate of capital depreciation
δh 0.009 rate of housing depreciation
ln a 0.005 growth rate
ρz 0.00 autocorrelation of log technology shock
ρω 0.00 autocorrelation of log disaster size
ρp 0.95 autocorrelation of log disaster probability
σz 0.01 conditional standard deviation of log technology shock
σω 0.67 conditional standard deviation of log disaster size
σp/
q
1−ρ2p 2.5 unconditional standard deviation of log disaster probability
ω̄ -0.067 disaster size
p̄/exp(
σ2p
2(1−ρ2p) ) 0.0079 mean disaster probability
q 0.93 probability for disaster persistence
χg b 0.20 default loss of government bonds as fraction of disaster size
χcb 0.38 default loss of corporate bonds as fraction of disaster size
Tg b 1 maturity of the government bond
Tcb 10 maturity of the corporate bond
mcb 0.37 corporate’s financial leverage
Notes: ∗) Endogenous by the model.
3.4.2 Calibration
Our analysis considers different variations of the model. We start with a variation of the model,
named F, which excludes housing before introducing housing into the model in variation G.
In models F and G disaster risk is time-varying in that both the probability pt and the disaster
size ωt follow stochastic processes (3.4.1) and (3.4.2), respectively. Model H shuts down the
stochastic effect for pt and model I for ωt while in model J both effects are shut down.
First, the share α of capital in production and the depreciation rates δk and δh of productive
capital and housing remain the same as in our variation of the Jermann (1998) model with
housing (model B). We increase the coefficient of RRA moderately to γ = 5.5 and set the
now disentangled EIS to ψ= 2 following Gourio (2012). We maintain our strategy to set the
elasticities in the composite good in such way that the household’s expenditures on housing
account to 19 percent of his total consumption expenditures and that the household works one
third of his time endowment on balanced growth (Model D/E). Moreover, the average growth
rate a of technology during normal times is also kept the same as before and corresponds to
the value in Gourio (2012). We set ρz = 0 and σz = 0.01 so that during normal times the
stochastic process governing technological progress is identical to the process for the permanent
component of productivity in Gourio (2012). The share of land in new houses is set to the upper
bound φ = 0.3 from Fehrle (2019) in order to fit the model closer to the data.14
The calibration of the ’free’ parameters β and κ and of the additional parameters from
the introduction of rare disasters is guided by Gourio (2012) and Fernández-Villaverde and
14We present and discuss the results of model G with φ = 0.106 in Appendix 3.B. Favilukis, Ludvigson, and
Nieuwerburgh (2017) proceed similar by setting the land share equal to 0.1 and 0.25.
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Levintal (2018) but moderately adjusted in order to fit the model closer to the data. More
precisely, we set β = 0.995 and κ = 0.8. Further, we follow Gourio (2012) and assume an
iid process for the disaster size, i.e. ρω = 0. We choose ω̄ = −0.067 and σω = 0.67 which
implies a mean disaster size of approximately 8 percent. In comparison, the mean disaster size
of the transitory and permanent components combined is approximately 6 percent in Gourio
(2012). For the probability to enter a disaster, we choose a moderately larger autocorrelation
ρp = 0.95 and a moderately lower standard deviation σp = 2.5
q
1−ρ2p instead of ρp = 0.9 and
σp = 2.8
q
1−ρ2p in Gourio (2012). Finally, p̄ is set such way that the average probability of
entering a disaster is 0.72 percent—the same value used by Gourio (2012)—while the persistence
of disasters is pinned down to q = 0.93—moderately above the value of q = 0.914 employed by
Gourio (2012).
Lastly, we make the following assumptions for asset prices. Consistent with Barro (2006)
and Gourio (2012) the default loss of government bonds is 20 percent of the disaster size, i.e.
χgb = 0.2, while the default loss of corporate bonds is set to a higher value of χcb = 0.38. We
consider government bonds with maturity of one period since our empirical counterpart are bills,
and the maturity of corporate bonds is set to Tcb = 10. Gourio (2012) reports financial leverage
of approximately 30 percent in the data. However, he interprets leverage in a broader way, i.e.
also as operating leverage, and therefore chooses a larger level of leverage of approximately 50
percent for the calibration of his model. Our value of mcb = 0.37 lies in between.
3.4.3 Results
Table 3.8 presents the asset return statistics for unlevered equity, for housing and for a real
risk-free bond while Table 3.9 shows the return rates for a government bond with partial default
in disasters and for leveraged equity. The business cycle statistics are summarized in Table 3.10.
Note that we follow Gourio (2012) and, except for row G*, report statistics which are computed
from samples where no disasters appear.
First, comparing rows F and G reveals that the introduction of housing into the model has
only negligible effects on the return rates of unlevered and leveraged equity. The model (G)
can explain return rates on leveraged equity and on government bonds which are close to the
data and the model can replicate an equity premium of 6.56 percent. In accordance to the
data, the return on housing (4.35 percent) and the housing premium (3.00 percent) turn out
smaller than the return on equity and the equity premium. Yet, they remain approximately 1.5
percentage points below the values found in the data. Nevertheless, the model can closely match
the empirical total risk premium. The model can further generate a low volatility of government
bonds and reproduces the empirically observed standard deviations of returns and premia on
housing fairly well. The standard deviations of equity returns and premia in the model are
less than half of their empirical counterparts. Risk premia in the model are moderately more
volatile than the risky return rates. Although the return rates and volatilities differ between the
two risky assets, their Sharpe ratios turn out almost identical at approximately 0.9 and also
coincide with the Sharpe ratio of total risk. Hence, the model can closely replicate the Sharpe
ratio of housing of approximately 1.01 in the data but fails for the Sharpe ratio of equity which
is substantially lower at 0.36 in the data.
Turning to business cycle statistics, the volatility of GDP in the model is too small. However,
the model is able to generate relative volatilities of business investments (2.78), residential
investments (5.56) and house prices (1.67) which all fit the data. Moreover, the model also
reproduces the empirically observed correlation between GDP and residential investments and
between GDP and house prices. The model shows almost perfect positive correlations between
residential investments and house prices and between residential investments and business
investments—and both correlations are also positive in the data.
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Table 3.8: Simulated returns, premiums and second moments II (no default, no leverage)
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P SRE SRH SRT
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27 0.36 1.01 0.75
Model
F 4.6 – – 0.88 3.70 – – 0.90 – –
G 4.88 4.35 4.64 1.13 3.72 3.19 3.49 0.88 0.94 0.91
G∗ 3.31 2.8 3.08 −0.15 3.46 2.95 3.24 0.62 0.60 0.62
H 5.34 4.91 5.15 −1.25 6.66 6.21 6.46 5.33 8.51 6.33
I 4.41 4.04 4.25 2.32 2.06 1.69 1.90 0.64 0.71 0.68
J 4.70 4.42 4.58 1.33 3.34 3.06 3.22 2.67 4.43 3.19
σ(RE) σ(RH) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.90 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
Model
F 3.42 – – 1.61 4.11 – –
G 3.56 2.64 3.15 1.58 4.22 3.41 3.85
G∗ 5.82 5.26 5.56 3.55 5.55 4.92 5.26
H 1.25 0.73 1.03 0.07 1.25 0.73 1.02
I 2.78 1.86 2.36 1.07 3.20 2.37 2.81
J 1.25 0.70 1.01 0.07 1.25 0.69 1.01
Notes: Mean percentage returns of equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ) as well as the equity
(EP), housing (HP), and the total risk premium (T P). The corresponding standard deviations σ(X ) as well as
the Sharpe ratios of equity (SRE), of housing (SRH) and of total risk (SRT ). We employ projection methods and
simulated time series with 100,000 periods. The sample does not include disasters except for row G*. F: Benchmark
rare disaster. G: F + Housing (no disaster sample). G*: F + Housing (disaster sample). H: G but constant disaster
probability. I: G but constant disaster size. J: G but constant disaster probability and size.
Table 3.9: Simulated returns, premiums and second moments II (default and leverage)
RlevE RH R
lev
T Rg b EP
lev HP T P lev SRE SRH SRT
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27 0.36 1.01 0.75
Model
F 7.64 – – 1.07 6.52 – – 0.92 – –
G 7.93 4.35 6.34 1.31 6.56 3.00 4.98 0.90 0.91 0.91
G∗ 6.08 2.80 4.63 0.03 6.04 2.76 4.60 0.66 0.61 0.65
H 10.87 4.91 8.25 −0.72 11.65 5.66 9.02 5.80 7.75 6.22
I 6.05 4.04 5.17 2.42 3.57 1.59 2.70 0.66 0.69 0.67
J 7.51 4.42 6.17 1.59 5.86 2.80 4.53 2.93 4.06 3.15
σ(RlevE ) σ(RH) σ(R
lev
T ) σ(Rg b) σ(EP
lev) σ(HP) σ(T P lev)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.90 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
Model
F 6.47 – – 1.43 7.12 – –
G 6.67 2.64 4.87 1.39 7.29 3.29 5.50
G∗ 9.34 5.26 7.44 3.45 9.13 4.51 7.08
H 2.01 0.73 1.45 0.07 2.01 0.73 1.45
I 5.03 1.86 3.62 0.94 5.41 2.29 4.01
J 2.00 0.70 1.44 0.07 2.00 0.69 1.44
Notes: Mean percentage returns of leveraged equity (RlevE ), housing (RH), leveraged total risk (R
lev
T ) and bills
(Rgb), as well as the leveraged equity (EP
lev), housing (HP), and the leveraged total risk premium (T P lev) and the
corresponding standard deviations σ(X ). We employ projection methods and simulated time series with 100,000
periods. The sample does not include disasters except for row G*. F: Benchmark rare disaster. G: F + Housing (no
disaster sample). G*: F + Housing (disaster sample). H: G but constant disaster probability. I: G but constant
disaster size. J: G but constant disaster probability and size.
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USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.64
Model
F 0.90 2.76 – – – – – –
G 0.93 2.78 5.56 1.67 1.00 0.99 0.66 0.66
G* 2.72 1.94 3.55 1.07 1.00 0.96 0.63 0.63
H 0.84 1.12 1.78 0.53 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
I 0.89 2.22 4.01 1.20 1.00 0.98 0.69 0.69
J 0.84 1.12 1.70 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: σx is the standard deviation of x , r
x
y the correlation between x and y. Business cycle statistics from
HP-filtered (1600) times series. We employ projection methods. Business cycle statistics are the mean outcome
of repeated simulations of hp-filtered (1600) times series with 180 periods each. The sample does not include
disasters except for row G*. F: Benchmark rare disaster. G: F + Housing (no disaster sample). G*: F + Housing
(disaster sample). H: G but constant disaster probability. I: G but constant disaster size. J: G but constant disaster
probability and size.
The moments discussed so far from simulations without disasters are driven only by the agents’
expectations about disaster whereas the actual occurrence of disasters is shut off. Row G* of
the tables shows the moments from simulations which include disasters. With disasters in the
sample, the mean return rate of the government bond already falls close to zero. The return
on leveraged equity declines by approximately 2 percentage points and the equity premium
decreases by 0.5 percentage points towards its empirical target. The return on housing and
the housing premium decrease slightly less by approximately 1.5 and 0.25 percentage points,
respectively, and we can observe similar effects for the return on total risk. Of course, the most
obvious effect of samples with disasters is on the variables’ second moments. The sample with
disasters helps to increase the volatilities of the risky assets but also implies a counterfactual
large standard deviation of the government bond. Moreover, GDP becomes too volatile and the
model’s fit of the relative standard deviations deteriorates.
The effects of time-varying disaster risk are illustrated in rows H, I, and J, which show the
results from the model if the stochastic nature of the disaster probability, of the disaster size, or
of both components is shut down. First, row H reveals that a time-varying probability for the
economy to be hit by a disaster is essential for the model’s dynamics. While the unlevered return
rates on the risky assets and on total risk change only moderately if the probability for disasters is
held constant, the risk-free rate and the return on bonds—government and corporate—decrease
considerably. As a consequence of decreasing return rates on corporate bonds, the return on
leveraged equity increases substantially by more than 3 percentage points and the leveraged
equity premium now exceeds its empirical value almost by a factor of 2. On the other hand, since
the housing premium is unlevered, it is only affected by the decreasing return on government
bonds and, hence, rises only moderately above its empirical counterpart. The premium on
total risk remains close to the average of the two risky assets. Further, row H shows that a
time-varying probability to enter disasters is also the main factor to generate fluctuations in
the return rates. In fact, with constant disaster probability the standard deviation of bonds
falls close to zero and the standard deviations of returns on the risky assets and on total risk
collapse by a factor of 4-5. Similarly, row H of Table 3.10 also illustrates that a time-varying
disaster probability helps the model to generate the relative volatilities of business investments,
residential investments and house prices and also helps to disentangle the otherwise perfect
correlations between variables.
Since we assumed an uncorrelated shock process (ρω = 0), the model’s results depend far less
on the stochastic nature of the disaster size. In fact, shocks to the disaster size do not provoke
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any reactions of the model’s variables in non-disaster periods but the effects show only indirect
through expectations in the model solution. We can see from row I of tables 3.8 and 3.9 that, if
the stochastic effect on the disaster size is shut off, the return rates on the risky assets and on
total risk decline while the return on bonds increases. Moreover, a time varying disaster size
helps to moderately increase the volatilities of all return rates and also helps to increase the
relative volatilities of business investments, residential investments and house prices (see row I
of Table 3.10). On the other hand, the variables’ correlations remain almost unchanged.
3.4.4 Summary and discussion:
Figure 3.1 displays the reaction of the model’s variables in response to a one time shock to
technology zt (panels (a)-(c)), to a one time shock to the probability pt of entering a disaster
(panels ((d)-(f)) and to a disaster which lasts for 5 periods (panels (g)-(i)) starting from the
stochastic steady state in a non-disaster period.15 We show percent deviations from the initial
balanced growth path.
First, the variables’ response to a ’classic’ technology shock (panels (a)-(c)) is standard, and
business investments, residential investments, and consumption increase in the period the
shock hits the economy. An increase of business investments implies an increasing Tobin’s
q, qt = (1/ϕ1)(It/Kt)κ, and increasing residential investments imply increasing house prices,
Ph,t = (1/(1−φ))Dφt . Although Dt increases more than It , the elasticity κ of Tobin’s q exceeds
the elasticity φ of house prices and Tobin’s q expands significantly more than house prices.
Moreover, increasing productivity yields an increasing marginal product of capital and increasing
consumption implies an increasing marginal rate of substitution between housing and consump-
tion. In consequence, the returns on unlevered equity and on housing increase but—mainly due
to the larger elasticity of Tobin’s q—the return on unlevered equity dominates. Bonds do not
react since the technology process is uncorrelated (ρz = 0), and debt additionally multiplies the
effect for the leveraged return on equity.
On the other hand, an increase of the probability for the economy to enter a disaster has the
following effects (see panels (d)-(f)). Positive autocorrelation (ρp > 0) implies an increased
risk for a drop in productivity and for destruction of capital in the next period. In consequence,
the representative agent lowers investments in productive capital and in residential structures
and increases consumption instead. Decreasing investments entail drops in Tobin’s q and in
house prices. Although investments in residential structures decline more than investments in
productive capital, the different elasticities again imply that the effect on Tobin’s q dominates
the effect on house prices. Moreover, a reduction of working hours implies a decreasing
marginal product of capital rt whereas increasing consumption implies that the marginal rate of
substitution between housing and consumption increases. The more pronounced drop in Tobin’s
q compared to the drop in house prices combined with an increasing MRSH,C yields a larger
contraction of the return on unlevered equity than of the return on housing and the effect is
further amplified by leverage. Finally, increased disaster risk increases the stochastic discount
factor so that bond prices increase. Yet, the effect is significantly smaller than on the risky assets.
Lastly, an occurrence of a disaster (panels ((g)-(i)) implies that technology At drops by the
factor eω̄ as long as the disaster continues. In the period the disaster starts, a second effect
appears. The probability that the disaster remains persistent raises to q = 0.93 whereas the
probability to enter a disaster was initially only p ≈ 0.0072. The massive increase in probability
for continued destruction of technology, capital and residential structures in the subsequent
period has the previously described effects—amplified by a multitude. The two effects combined—
drop in productivity and increased risk for the disaster to persist—cause huge drops of business
15As already noted, the assumption of an iid process for the disaster size (ρω = 0) implies that shocks to the
disaster size do not provoke any reaction of the model’s remaining variables.
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(i) Disaster bt = 1 (III)
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investments and residential investments in the initial period of the disaster. In the following
disaster periods, expectations do not change anymore until the disaster ends so that investments
are only effected by decreasing technology, capital and residential structures. The initial drop
of business investments exceeds the destruction of productive capital so that Tobin’s q also
collapses. In the following periods the effect turns and business investments decline by less
than the rate at which capital is destructed so that Tobin’s q begins to slowly recover. On the
other hand, since land is not destructed, house prices continue to decline as long as Dt declines.
Finally, once the disaster ends, the probability for the economy to be hit by a disaster again
jumps back to p ≈ 0.0072. The massive change in expectations leads to a boom immediately
after the disaster. Both investments increase and so do Tobin’s q and house prices. The huge
drops in Tobin’s q and in house prices at the start of the disaster yield huge drops in the return
rates while the boom after the disaster ends implies huge yields of both risky assets.
Summing up, the model can generate different premia for unlevered equity and housing
mainly due to different elasticities for Tobin’s q and for house prices. Additionally, the gap
between the two risky assets can be enlarged by leverage. However, we could not achieve
further improvements of the model fit, in particular for the volatility of the return on equity, by
fine-tuning the parameters controlling the elasticities of Tobin’s q and of house prices. Increasing
the elasticity κ of Tobin’s q has the desired effect and helps to generate more volatile return
rates on equity. However, it also implies a too large premium on equity compared to housing
and, counterfactual to the data, reduces the volatility of business investments. Decreasing the
elasticity of house prices φ also impairs the model’s fit. At odds to the data, the return on
housing and its volatility decrease while the Sharpe ratio of housing further increases.16
The main shortcoming of the model’s asset price statistics, independent of the calibration,
remains the fact that the Sharpe ratios of the two risky assets turn out far too similar.17 In order
to identify the reasons for this failure, we can return to equation (3.3.4). Note that by definition

































Hence, proceeding in an analogous way as before, the Sharpe ratio of housing and of leveraged
















































We summarize the decomposition of the Sharpe ratios in Table 3.11. Note however, that
16See Appendix 3.B.
17Different from the non-disaster models in section 3.3, we did not optimize the model’s fit by matching moments
with regard to the ’free’ parameters. First, even with more efficient methods, as e.g. Polynomial Chaos
Expansions proposed by Fehrle, Heiberger, and Huber (2019), such parameter inference would still be too time
consuming. Second, we argue that it is the model’s structure which is too simple to disentangle the Sharpe
ratios of equity and housing.
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E SRH rM ,EP rM ,EPlev rM ,HP rEP,HP rEPlev,HP
Data
USA – – 0.36 1.01 – – – – 0.19
Model
G 0.64 0.88 0.90 0.91 −0.70 −0.76 −0.66 0.99 0.98
G* 0.96 0.62 0.66 0.61 −0.62 −0.66 −0.61 0.99 0.98
Notes: SRE : annualized Sharpe ratio of equity, SRH : annualized Sharpe ratio of housing, rX ,Y : correlation
between variables X and Y where Mt+1 : stochastic discount factor, EPt+1 := RE,t+1 −R f ,t : ex-post equity premium,
HPt+1 := RH,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post housing premium.
we compute moments from the simulation of the model’s equilibrium outcomes so that the
decompositions (3.4.4) only hold for samples that are consistent with the agent’s expectations
in the model solution, i.e. for samples which include disasters (G*). For non-disaster samples
(G), it can be interpreted at best as a rough approximation which neglects the effects from the
occurrence of disasters.
Nonetheless, the major deficit of the model is obvious. The return rates and also the premia
between the two risky assets are again almost perfectly correlated so that their correlations with
the stochastic discount factor are practically identical. The model’s relatively simple structure
implies that the effects of shocks on risky return rates are aligned and may only differ in size.
This fact also becomes clearly evident from Figure 3.1 and the above interpretation of the
impulse response functions. Hence, by (3.4.4) the Sharpe ratios of the two assets must be the
same. Compared to the models without disaster risk in Table 3.6, the introduction of disasters
risk raises the standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor by a factor of 4. The model
can therefore explain substantially larger Sharpe ratios and matches the value of housing from
the data. Yet, it now fails to simultaneously generate the lower Sharpe ratio of equity and, in
consequence, produces far to involatile return rates on equity. Finally, the perfect correlation
between the risky assets still implies that the mean and the standard deviation of returns on
total risk are the weighted averages of the two risky assets. In order to explain the different
Sharpe ratios of the two assets and in order to prevent the counterfactual characteristics of the
total portfolio, it would be necessary to introduce effects into the model which help to dissolve
the perfect correlation between the risky return rates.
Any mechanism that increases the volatility of the retrun on equity and decreases, in absolute
terms, the correlation of the return on equity with the stochastic discount factor would improve
the models fit. Assuming additionally that cooperate bonds could default in normal times meets
these requirements.18 The additional source of uncertainty increases the volatility of the return
on equity while the assumption of independence decrease in absolute terms the correlation
between the stochastic discount factor and the return on equity.
Other mechanisms concerning housing specific characteristics could improve the model’s
fit in general. E.g. due to the poor divisibility of housing, there may be credit constrained
households which can only invest in equity. For them it would be impossible to smooth the
consumption bundle by adjusting consumption and residential investment and subsequently the
equity premia would increase. Albeit, housing investment participation distributes far broader
and is less concentrated towards the top quantiles than the participation at the stock market as
Kuhn, Schularick, and Steins (forthcomming) show. This indicates that the effect is minimal at
best.
Among others, Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) find a large effect of housing wealth on consumption.
18Gourio (2012) argues e.g. the financial crises 2008 was not a great diasaster and US-treasury bonds and bills did
not default. Nevertheless, a lot of cooporate bonds defaulted.
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Modeling such a channel would increase in absolute terms the correlation between house prices
and the stochastic discount factor and thus between the return on housing and the stochastic
discount factor, which would separate the Sharpe ratios. Theoretical foundations for a large
causal effect are given e.g. by Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra (2017) and Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2017). Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) summarize this channel in a review as follows:
Mortgages are the household’s most common structure of debt. Hence, declining house prices
increase the households leverage ratio and the resulting tightened budget constraint forces the
household to reduce his consumption spending.
Last, the fact that the risk of housing wealth is more idiosyncratic increases the volatility of
the return on housing on an individual level. This is neither observable in a representative agent
framework nor in the aggregated data of JKKST and thus explains potentially the difference in
the Sharpe ratios. The PSID-based data from Flavin and Yamashita (2002) imply a Sharpe ratio
of equity of 0.35, similar to the aggregated one, but the Sharpe ratio of housing is reduced by
half to 0.47. Even if this explains a large part, a differential of one third remains.
3.5 Conclusion
In the present paper, we study the effects of housing on asset pricing statistics, especially on risk
premia, in production economies. The stylized facts for asset prices which we consider are: i)
a risk-free rate in the range of 1-2.2 percent together with a low volatility, ii) return rates on
equity moderately larger than returns on housing, iii) premia on risky returns over 3 percent,
iv) return rates and premia on equity which are at least twice as volatile as return rates and
premia on housing and on total risk, and v) a Sharpe ratio of housing significantly larger than
the Sharpe ratio of equity and similar to the Sharpe ratio of total risk. Since we study production
economies, we also check the model’s compatibility to the following well-established stylized
facts of housing and business cycles: i) volatility of residential investments exceeds the volatility
of business investments, ii) house prices are at least twice as volatile as GDP and are positively
correlated with GDP, and iii) residential investments co-moves with house prices, GDP, and
business investments.
We first introduce housing into non-disaster economies with habits and capital adjustment costs
a la Jermann (1998). Housing provides the household with an insurance against fluctuations
in the composite good and the model’s ability to generate sizeable risk premia vanishes in
consequence. However, the household’s desire to smooth his consumption of the composite
good induces demand effects which coincide with business cycle characteristics. Limitation of
the household’s option to smooth consumption of the composite good helps to generate modest
risk premia but also eliminates the demand effects and hence reduces the model’s fit to business
cycle statistics. Moreover, the risk-free rate is far too volatile in the model and the model fails to
explain the empirically observed differences between the returns on equity and on housing.
Second, we extend a standard RBC model with disaster risk similar to Gourio (2012) and
Fernández-Villaverde and Levintal (2018) by housing. We find that the model can reproduce
return rates on leveraged equity, on housing and on government bonds which are all close to
the data. Moreover, the model can also match the volatility of government bonds and housing
returns but equity returns are too involatile compared to the data. Different premia and different
volatilities for equity and housing in the model are the result of i) different adjustment costs
for productive capital and for residential structures which result in different elasticities of stock
prices and of ii) leverage on equity. However, despite different premia and volatilities between
the two risky assets, the model does not allow to disentangle the Sharpe ratios. Our calibration
allows close replication of the empirical Sharpe ratios of housing and of total risk while the
Sharpe ratio of equity exceeds its empirical counterpart substantially. Finally, regardless of
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its rather simple structure, the model is also able to generate relative volatilities of business
investments, residential investments and house prices which all fit the data. Moreover, the model
also reproduces the empirically observed correlation between GDP and residential investments
and between GDP and house prices.
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Appendix
3.A Stylized facts and data Resources
3.A.1 Stylized facts
In Table 3.A1 we present return rates for all countries from the JKKST database. We observe
the following stylized facts. First, risk premia in all countries are sizeable with equity premia
between 1.17 percent in Portugal and 12.91 percent in Finland, and housing premia between
3.47 and 8.39 percent in Germany and Norway, respectively. Second, in all countries except
for Italy and Portugal the return on housing is lower than the return on equity. Third, in all
countries listed the volatility of returns and premia on equity exceeds the volatility of returns
and premia on housing and the volatility of the risk-free rate is the smallest. Fourth, the Sharp
ratio of housing is larger than of equity in all listed countries. Last, there is no systematic nexus
between the return on housing and on equity.
Table 3.A2 displays the business cycle statistics for the same countries. Note that for several
continental European countries the standard deviation of residential investment exceeds the
standard deviation of business investment only slightly or is even smaller. More precisely, this
is the case for France, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Spain.
House prices are pro-cyclical with GDP and more volatile than GDP in all countries except
for Germany. Business investment and residential investment are positively correlated in all
countries but Sweden and Australia, and house prices and residential investment are positively
correlated throughout.
3.A.2 Sources
The data pertaining the rates of return, mortgage etc. are from JKKST. The source of the data
pertaining the business cycle statistics is listed below:
• GDP, residential investment, non-residential investment: OECD Economic Outlook Nov
2018; Denmark: Statistics Denmark.
• House prices: OECD Real house price indices, s.a. 16.05.2019 devided by the OECD
Economic Outlook Nov 2018 CPI Deflator.
• Population: FRA, USA: OECD Total population PERSA: Persons, seasonally adjusted;
UK: Office for National Statistics UK, resident population: mid-year estimates (Qtly data
interpolated (by the Office); Otherwise: Yearly, Worldbank, midyear (interpolated (by
own calculation)).
• Home ownership rates: Japan (2007): http://www.stat.go.jp/english/index.html; USA
(2007), Australia (2003): https://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/evolution
%20of%20homeownership%20rates.pdf p.212; Otherwise (2010): EUROSTAT "Eurostat -
Data Explorer - Distribution of population by tenure status, type of household and income
group"
CHAPTER 3 THE RETURN ON EVERYTHING AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN PRODUCTION ECONOMIES 39
Table 3.A1: Returns, premiums and second moments
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P
AUS 6.84 7.01 7.22 2.00 4.84 5.02 5.22
BEL 10.29 8.02 8.65 2.49 7.80 5.53 6.16
DNK 13.35 6.6 8.69 0.72 12.63 5.88 7.96
FIN 14.17 8.84 11.67 1.25 12.91 7.59 10.41
FRA 9.61 5.78 6.61 2.24 7.37 3.54 4.37
GER 9.04 4.75 5.75 1.28 7.76 3.47 4.47
ITA 4.76 5.62 5.89 1.55 3.21 4.07 4.34
JPA 5.86 5.54 6.19 0.98 4.88 4.56 5.21
NLD 8.93 7.83 8.12 1.44 7.49 6.38 6.68
NOR 13.03 9.82 10.66 1.43 11.60 8.39 9.23
PRT 2.92 6.65 6.62 1.75 1.17 4.89 4.87
ESP 7.10 4.43 4.89 0.69 6.40 3.74 4.20
SWE 12.29 8.82 10.56 0.91 11.38 7.92 9.65
CH 7.23 6.01 6.98 −0.17 7.40 6.19 7.16
UK 8.00 7.00 7.47 1.56 6.44 5.44 5.91
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27
σ(RE) σ(RH ) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
AUS 21.53 5.71 6.02 3.32 21.32 6.22 6.27
BEL 22.99 6.04 6.37 2.84 23.08 6.61 7.02
DNK 23.84 7.72 8.91 1.56 24.33 7.24 8.93
FIN 37.72 9.13 21.58 4.52 36.90 9.64 21.39
FRA 24.11 5.52 6.95 2.55 23.98 6.18 7.39
GER 22.82 3.12 5.09 1.73 23.12 4.30 5.99
ITA 27.98 10.77 10.07 3.18 27.57 11.51 10.74
JPA 20.15 6.53 8.10 2.53 19.94 6.47 8.03
NLD 22.06 9.14 9.40 2.91 22.13 9.68 9.91
NOR 29.60 8.51 9.02 2.39 29.66 9.64 10.12
PRT 26.86 7.26 7.64 2.57 26.81 7.39 7.64
ESP 27.13 8.36 8.62 4.43 25.93 8.19 8.10
SWE 26.03 7.35 11.67 2.06 25.75 7.22 11.42
CH 21.61 4.59 8.01 2.29 21.41 4.94 7.97
UK 8.00 7 7.47 1.56 6.44 5.44 5.91
USA 16.71 3.78 6.90 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
SRE SRH SRT rEP,HP rEP,TP rHP,TP
Data
AUS 0.23 0.81 0.83 −0.09 0.58 0.72
BEL 0.34 0.84 0.88 −0.05 0.43 0.87
DNK 0.52 0.81 0.89 0.37 0.81 0.83
FIN 0.35 0.79 0.49 0.25 0.83 0.5
FRA 0.31 0.57 0.59 0.06 0.63 0.76
GER 0.34 0.81 0.75 0.21 0.79 0.74
ITA 0.12 0.35 0.4 −0.24 −0.01 0.97
JPA 0.24 0.7 0.65 0.16 0.79 0.72
NLD 0.34 0.66 0.67 0.02 0.52 0.84
NOR 0.39 0.87 0.91 −0.01 0.46 0.86
PRT 0.04 0.66 0.64 0.07 0.49 0.89
ESP 0.25 0.46 0.52 0.09 0.4 0.94
SWE 0.44 1.1 0.85 0.01 0.8 0.5
CH 0.35 1.25 0.9 −0.19 0.88 0.18
UK 0.27 0.61 0.69 −0.13 0.72 0.54
USA 0.36 1.01 0.75 0.19 0.9 0.56
Notes: Mean percentage returns of equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ) as well as the equity
(EP), housing (HP), and the total risk premium (T P) and the corresponding standard deviations σ(X ). SRE :
Sharpe ratio of equity, SRH : Sharpe ratio of housing, SRT : Sharpe ratio of total risk rX ,Y : correlation between
variables X and Y where EPt+1 := RE,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post equity premium, HPt+1 := RH,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post housing
premium T Pt+1 := RT,t+1 − R f ,t : ex-post total risk premium. Periods: Australia 1970-2015, Belgium 1976-2015,
Denmark 1995-2015, Finland 1970-2015, France 1980-2015, Germany 1991-2015, Italy 1970-2015, Japan 1963-
2015, the Netherlands 1970-2015, Norway 1978-2015, Portugal 1988-2015. Spain 1971-2015, Sweden 1970-2015,
Switzerland 1970-2015, United Kingdom 1969-2015, USA 1970-2015, data from JKKST, own calculations.
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AUS 1.24 3.77 6.65 3.56 0.55 −0.12 0.56 0.35
BEL 1.02 4.21 7.19 3.54 0.62 0.22 0.47 0.31
DNK 1.42 3.52 5.95 3.96 0.60 0.28 0.66 0.75
FIN 2.21 2.87 3.15 3.00 0.73 0.40 0.67 0.66
FRA 0.95 2.75 3.17 3.19 0.65 0.64 0.81 0.48
GER 1.47 2.54 2.20 0.82 0.06 0.49 0.57 −0.16
ITA 1.44 2.66 1.67 3.73 0.25 0.37 0.46 0.15
JPA 1.59 2.41 3.84 2.70 0.31 0.27 0.45 0.55
NLD 1.37 5.86 5.57 4.08 0.40 0.31 0.48 0.35
NOR 1.46 4.68 4.51 3.72 0.60 0.28 0.31 0.56
PRT 1.58 3.37 2.58 1.87 0.40 0.56 0.64 0.50
ESP 1.33 3.48 3.42 4.17 0.43 0.69 0.77 0.61
SWE 1.51 4.46 5.20 2.95 0.42 −0.22 0.04 0.57
CHE 1.64 – – 2.69 – – – 0.61
UK 1.58 2.68 5.56 4.85 0.51 0.16 0.69 0.71
USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.64
Notes: Business cycle statistics are from quarterly logged per capita hp-filtered (1600) data. σx is the standard
deviation of x , r xy the correlation between x and y . RESI=residential investment, BUSI=non-residential investment,
Ph house prices. Periods: Australia 1970-2015, Belgium 1976-2015, Denmark 1995-2015, Finland 1970-2015,
France 1980-2015, Germany 1991-2015, Italy 1970-2015, Japan 1963-2015, the Netherlands 1970-2015, Norway
1978-2015, Portugal 1988-2015. Spain 1971-2015, Sweden 1970-2015, Switzerland 1970-2015, United Kingdom
1969-2015, USA 1970-2015, Data: See Appendix 3.A, own calculations.
3.B Further Results
Economies with Non-Disaster risk
Higher share of land’s value in new houses: We show the results from increasing the share of
land in the Jermann (1998) model with housing to φ = 0.3 in row K of tables 3.B2 and 3.B3.
First, the return rates on both risky assets increase moderately while the risk-free rate decreases
slightly. Nevertheless, the model can still not produce sizable risk premia. The volatility of
residential investment decreases only moderately and remains far too large. On the other hand,
house prices in the model become noticeably more volatile than empirically observed.
We also present the results for the two-sector model a la Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001)
with φ = 0.3 in rows L, M, and N of tables 3.B2 and 3.B3. We fine-tune the free parameters by
matching moments in the same way as we did for φ = 0.106 and summarize the parameters’
values in Table 3.B1. Risk premia decrease moderately in model L compared to model C and
again vanish if labor supply is endogenously determined in model M. In model N with limited
sectoral labor mobility changes are only negligible compared to model E. The volatility of
house prices increases in all three models and, as Fehrle (2019) shows, the correlations also
increase. Nevertheless, with labor market frictions house prices do not co-move with residential
investment.
To sum up, an increase in the share of land’s value in new houses does not affect the conclusion
that the present framework can not simultaneously reproduce asset pricing statistics and business
cycle statistics as observed in the data.
Habitat without habits: The effects of habits in consumption, housing and leisure, respectively,
can be discussed by setting the corresponding habit parameter to zero in model E. First, rows
N of tables 3.B2 and 3.B3 show that habits in housing have negligible consequences for the
presented business cycle characteristics and only small significance for risk premia. Without
habits in housing, risk premia on both assets are reduced by approximately 0.8 percentage points.
Rows O of the same tables show that without habits in leisure risk premia are halved. Moreover,
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Table 3.B1: Calibration























Notes: ∗) Endogenous by the model. L: C but φ = 0.3. M/N: D/E but φ = 0.3.
the volatility of house prices reduces towards its empirical counterpart but business investment
becomes even less volatile and the correlation between GDP and residential investment also
moves farther away from the value in the data.
Habits in consumption, see row P of tables 3.B2 and 3.B3, have the largest effect on the
results from model E. Without habits in consumption the household’s marginal utility does not
fluctuate enough between different realizations of the productivity shock so that risk premia
reduce drastically. While business investment becomes less volatile, the standard deviation of
residential investment increases. Moreover, the correlation between house prices and residential
investment becomes positive and the correlation between business and residential investment
also increases substantially.
Housing with disaster risk
Lower share of land’s value in new houses: Tables 3.B2 and 3.B3 display in rows R and Rlev the
effects from lowering the share of land in our disaster economies to φ = 0.106 as in Davis and
Heathcote (2005). We find that returns on equity do not change by much but housing premia
decrease by 0.7 percentage-points and the standard deviation of returns on housing is reduced
by 0.96. The Sharpe ratio of housing exceeds its empirical counterpart. Moreover, the volatility
of house prices drops below the standard deviation of GDP. The lower share of land in new
houses increases the volatility of residential investment which now becomes too large.
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Table 3.B2: Returns, premiums and second moments
RE RH RT R f EP HP T P
USA 7.45 6.01 6.84 1.57 5.88 4.45 5.27
Model
K 4.83 4.59 4.72 4.03 0.77 0.54 0.67
L 4.84 4.61 4.70 0.50 4.33 4.10 4.19
M 2.70 2.60 2.64 1.95 0.74 0.64 0.68
N 4.92 4.69 4.78 1.39 3.49 3.27 3.36
O 4.31 4.11 4.19 1.67 2.61 2.41 2.49
P 3.40 3.32 3.36 2.05 1.34 1.26 1.29
Q 2.66 2.50 2.57 2.02 0.63 0.47 0.54
R 5.16 3.87 4.59 1.36 3.76 2.49 3.20
Rlev 8.24 3.87 6.30 1.55 6.62 2.30 4.70
σ(RE) σ(RH) σ(RT ) σ(R f ) σ(EP) σ(HP) σ(T P)
USA 16.71 3.78 6.9 2.31 16.47 4.41 7.00
Model
K 8.25 6.01 7.29 1.45 8.09 5.80 7.11
L 22.43 21.47 21.86 8.49 20.62 19.57 19.99
M 8.82 7.70 8.14 2.13 8.54 7.37 7.84
N 22.77 21.81 22.19 12.84 18.62 17.42 17.90
O 19.93 19.00 19.39 11.59 16.04 14.87 15.36
P 14.75 14.17 14.41 8.65 11.92 11.17 11.49
Q 8.32 6.63 7.32 3.05 7.73 5.86 6.64
R 3.71 1.68 2.73 1.51 4.33 2.59 3.45
Rlev 6.83 1.68 4.45 1.32 7.41 2.44 5.07
Notes: Mean percentage returns of equity (RE), housing (RH), total risk (RT ) and bills (R f ) as well as the equity
(EP), housing (HP), and the total risk premium (T P) and the corresponding standard deviations σ(X ). We
employ a second order perturbation and simulated time series with 100,000 periods. K: B but φ = 0.3. L:L: C but
φ = 0.3, ,χh = 0.7. M: D but φ = 0.3χh = 0.7. N: E but φ = 0.3,χh = 0.7. O: E but χh = 0. P: E but χn = 0. Q: E
but χc = 0. R: G but φ = 0.106. Rlev: R but with leverage and default, housing remain not leveraged.
















USA 1.52 2.91 6.85 2.03 0.67 0.07 0.72 0.63
Model
K 1.05 1.10 11.44 3.26 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
L 2.11 1.05 1.03 4.79 −0.03 0.00 0.06 0.96
M 1.42 0.77 4.39 3.04 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.94
N 1.9 0.96 2.12 4.23 0.04 0.14 0.39 0.91
O 1.95 0.84 1.83 3.57 −0.06 0.07 0.35 0.88
P 1.89 0.65 2.16 2.73 −0.1 0.01 0.28 0.89
Q 1.44 0.71 2.95 2.17 0.11 0.35 0.52 0.91
R 1.01 2.59 8.51 0.90 1.00 0.89 0.68 0.68
Notes: σx is the standard deviation of x , r
x
y the correlation between x and y. Business cycle statistics from
HP-filtered (1600) times series. We employ a second order perturbation and report the average outcomes from
repeated simulations with 180 periods. K: B but φ = 0.3. L: C but φ = 0.3, ,χh = 0.7. M: D but φ = 0.3χh = 0.7.
N: E but φ = 0.3,χh = 0.7. O: E but χh = 0. P: E but χn = 0. Q: E but χc = 0. R: G but φ = 0.106.
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3.C Economies with non-disaster risk
We summarize the details for the models discussed in section 3.3.
3.C.1 Housing with Jermann (1998)
The equilibrium conditions from the optimization problem (3.3.1) for the benchmark Jermann
(1998) model which is extended by housing are determined by
Λt = µc(Ct − Cht)µc(1−η)−1(Ht −Hht)µh(1−η), (3.C.1a)
Yt = a
(1−αy )t Zt K
αy
t , (3.C.1b)























Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt , (3.C.1h)
Ch,t+1 = χcCt , (3.C.1i)































given the state variables Kt , Ht , Ch,t , Hh,t and Zt . Additionally, the log of productivity follows the
exogenous AR(1)-process
ln Zt+1 = ρy ln Zt + εt+1, εt ∼ iidN(0,σ2y).
Finally, GDP is defined by
GDPt = Yt +MRS
H,C








We re-scale the variables by kt :=
Kt
at , ht :=
Ht
a(1−φ)t , ch,t :=
Ch,t
at , hh,t :=
Hh,t
a(1−φ)t , yt :=
Yt





at , dt :=
Dt
at , ph,t :=
Ph,t
aφ t , and λt :=
Λt
a((µc+(1−φ)µh)(1−η)−1)t . Hence, system (3.C.1) in scaled
variables reads
λt = µc(ct − cht)µc(1−η)−1(ht − hht)µh(1−η), (3.C.2a)
yt = Zt k
αy
t , (3.C.2b)
























a1−φht+1 = (1−δh)ht + d1−φt , (3.C.2h)
ach,t+1 = χcct , (3.C.2i)































3.C.2 Moving to Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001)
We continue to present the details for the two-sector models from section 3.3.
Sectoral frictions with exogenous labor supply:
max






((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh)1−η − 1
1−η ,
s.t. Yt = a
(1−αy )t
y Zy t K
αy
y t ,
Yt = Ct + It ,
Dt = a
(1−αd )t
d Zd t K
αd
d t ,
It = Id t + I y t ,












Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt .
(3.C.3)
where η,αy ,αd , ay , ad ,µc,µh > 0,µc +µh = 1,δk ∈ [0,1],δh ∈ [0,1] and Φy(x) = ϕy,11−κy x1−κy +
ϕy,2 and Φd analogously.
First, if labor supply is exogenous, the system of equations derived from the optimization
problem (3.C.3) for an equilibrium in period t reads




















































Ht+1 = (1−δh)Ht + D1−φt , (3.C.4l)
Ch,t+1 = χcCt , (3.C.4m)
















































given the state variables Ky,t , Kd,t , Ht , Ch,t , Hh,t , Zy,t and Zd,t . Additionally, the log of produc-
tivity follows the exogenous AR(1)-process
ln Zy,t+1 = ρy ln Zy,t + εy,t+1,

















Finally, GDP is defined by
GDPt = Yt + Pd,t Dt ++MRS
H,C



































































. Hence, system (3.C.4) in scaled variables reads
λt = µc(ct − cht)µc(1−η)−1(ht − hht)µh(1−η), (3.C.5a)
yt = Zy,t k
αy
y,t , (3.C.5b)
dt = Zd,t k
αd
d,t , (3.C.5c)
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ht+1 = (1−δh)ht + d1−φt , (3.C.5l)







































































((Ct − Cht)µc(Ht −Hht)µh((1− Nt)− (1− Nht))µn)1−η − 1
1−η ,






Yt = Ct + It ,










where now µc,µh,µn > 0,µc +µh +µn = 1.
If labor supply is endogenous in the model as in (3.C.6), the system of equations defining
an equilibrium in the scaled variables remains as in (3.C.5) with the following adjustments to
the production functions and to the marginal utility of consumption and with the additional
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equations pinning down labor supply



























(1− Nt)− (1− Nh,t)
, (3.C.7e)
Nt = Ny,t − Nd,t , (3.C.7f)
Nh,t+1 = 1−χn(1− Nt). (3.C.7g)
Limited labor mobility Finally, if the household is unable to adapt his labor supply in response
to technology shocks but is committed to working hours that are contracted sector-specifically
























(1− Nt+1)− (1− Nh,t+1)

= 0. (3.C.8b)
3.D Housing with disaster risk
We present the details for the model with disaster risk from section 3.4.
Disaster Risk The economy faces a risk for great disasters which are introduced through an
exogenous shock in form of a binary variable bt which indicates disasters in case of bt = 1
while bt = 0 in normal times. Disasters reduce productivity but also partly destroy the stock of
productive capital and of residential structures (see below). Following Gourio (2012) disasters
appear with time-varying probability and size. More specifically, we assume that
P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 0) =min{pt , 1}, P(bt+1 = 0|bt = 0) = 1−min{pt , 1}
where the log of pt follows an AR(1)-process
ln pt+1 = (1−ρp) ln p̄+ρp ln pt + εp,t+1, εp,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2p).
Additionally, disasters remain persistent with probability no less than q ∈ (0,1) so that
P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 1) =max{q,min{pt , 1}}, P(bt+1 = 0|bt = 1) = 1−max{q, min{pt , 1}}.
Finally, the disaster size 1 − eωt+1 at which productivity, productive capital and residential
structures are destroyed by a disaster also evolves stochastically according to
ωt := ω̄e
ω̂t ,






where ω̄ < 0. We slightly deviate from the treatment in Gourio (2012) in the specification of the
process governing the disaster size and allow autocorrelation but restrict outcomes to ωt < 0 so
that disasters always have negative effects. The specification is similar to Fernández-Villaverde
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and Levintal (2018).
Representative Household The household derives utility from a composite good C̃t that is
represented by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate consisting of consumption Ct , housing Ht and leisure





t (1− Nt)1−µc−µh .
We assume that the household’s preferences over streams of the composite good are described















whereψ is the household’s EIS and γ the coefficient of RRA. Note however that γ andψ describe
the household’s RRA and EIS with respect to the composite good C̃ . Since the composite good
aggregator is of the Cobb-Douglas type, the consumption-based RRA is given by µcγ and the
consumption-based EIS reads 11−µc(1−1/ψ) .




Vt = (1− β)C̃
1− 1ψ





where we use, similar to Caldara, Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez, and Yao (2012), the
notation
θ := 1− 1− γ
1− 1ψ
.
In the case where θ = 0, the RRA equals the reciprocal of the EIS and the household’s utility
reduces to the ‘classical’ expected discounted sum of within period CRRA utilities. Hence, θ
can also be interpreted as the deviation from this ‘classic’ case. The representative household
supplies labor services Nt and capital services Kt and receives wages Wt and capital rents rt .
He buys consumption goods Ct and invests in productive capital It and new houses Hnew,t with
relative price Ph,t . Hence, his budget constraint reads
Wt Nt + rt Kt = Ct + It + Ph,t Hnew,t .
We assume capital adjustment costs as in Jermann (1998). Moreover, disasters result in the
destruction of a fraction 1− eωt+1 of the stocks of capital and residential structures so that the





















where δk,δh ∈ [0,1] and Φ(x) := ϕ11−κ x1−κ +ϕ2. The household maximizes life-time utility Vt
subject to his budget constraint and subject to the laws of accumulation for capital and housing.
19See Swanson (2012) and Heiberger and Ruf (2019).
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(Et V 1−θt+1 )1/(1−θ )
−θ






Representative Firm The firm produces output Yt from labor Nt and capital services Kt





Labor augmenting technical progress At grows stochastically and is damaged during disasters
such way that
At+1 = At ae
zt+1+ωt+1 bt+1 ,
zt+1 = ρzzt + εz,t+1, εz,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2z ).










Construction Sector Finally, residential investments Dt are combined with a fixed factor land












Pl,t = φPh,t D
1−φ
t .
General Equilibrium Summing up, in any period t the economy’s equilibrium is characterized
by the following system of equations
At = At−1e
zt+ωt bt , (3.D.1a)
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Kt = e
ωt bt K?t , (3.D.1b)
Ht = e











































































Vt = (1− β)(Cµct (1− Nt)µn Hµht )1−
1
ψ + β(Et V 1−θt+1 )
1
1−θ , (3.D.1p)
given the state variables K?t , H
?








(Et V 1−θt+1 )1/(1−θ )
−θ
Moreover, the exogenous state variables are governed by the stochastic processes
zt+1 = ρzzt + εz,t+1, εz,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2z ), (3.D.2a)
ln pt+1 = (1−ρp) ln p̄+ρp ln pt + εp,t+1, εp,t ∼ iidN(0,σ2p), (3.D.2b)
ωt := ω̄e






P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 0) =min{pt , 1}, P(bt+1 = 1|bt = 1) =max{q,min{pt , 1}}. (3.D.2d)
Finally, we define GDP as the sum of consumption, both investment types and the implicit rent
from housing
GDPt = Yt +MRS
H,C





















































. Hence, the system of equations (3.D.1) can be written equivalently in
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terms of the scaled variables as
at = e
zt+ωt bt , (3.D.3a)
kt = e
ωt bt k?t , (3.D.3b)
ht = e
















































































vt = (1− β)(cµct (1− Nt)µnhµht )1−
1













(Et v1−θt+1 )1/(1−θ )
−θ
.
Solution Method First, note that given period t ’s scaled state variables k?t , h
?
t , zt ,ωt , pt and
bt and the control variables for labor supply Nt , house prices ph,t and the value function vt ,
all other period t variables as well as next period’s endogenous state variables can be easily
computed from equations (3.D.3a)-(3.D.3m). We approximate the policy functions for Nt , ph,t
and the value function vt by linear combinations of Chebyshev polynomials. We compute the
coefficients in the linear combinations such way that the Euler equations (3.D.3n) and (3.D.3o)
and the recursive equation (3.D.3p) for the value function are satisfied exactly at a sparse grid of
collocation points (see Judd, Maliar, Maliar, and Valero (2014) and Heer and Maussner (2009)
for details). Thereby, the expectations with respect to normally distributed random variables
are computed by Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
Chapter 4
Business cycle accounting for the German fiscal
stimulus program during the Great Recession
— Daniel Fehrle and Johannes Huber—
4.1 Introduction
In response to the Great Recession in 2008 and 2009, the German government, like many others,
launched an expansive fiscal stimulus program. This policy intervened on different markets by
increasing transfers and government spending, decreasing tax rates and social contributions
and expanding short-time work possibilities. Particularly noteworthy is the German cash for
clunkers program, since this car subsidy affected one of Germany’s core industries and was
internationally incomparably large (5 Billion€or 0.2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)).
Altogether, the program amounted to 82 billion €or 3.2 percent of GDP. These considerable
expenditures raise the following questions: What are the consequences of these measures for
macroeconomic markets and how effective was this program for aggregated output?
Such questions are difficult to answer, which is why fiscal stimuli might be the most contro-
versially discussed anti-cyclical measures. To address them, there are basically two approaches
(see e.g. Hebous (2010)): The first is to model a theoretical framework with deep structural
equations, parameters, and shocks. An arbitrary number of shocks describes changes in fis-
cal policy, and impulse response functions as well as multipliers illustrate the consequences.
Since the structure, the parametrization, and, at least partly, the parameter values ground
on assumptions, the results are assumption-driven. The second approach bases on statistical
models, in particular vector autoregressions (VARs). They are less theoretical and, in comparison
to many of the former models, can be estimated with classical techniques. Unfortunately, in
general it is impossible to distinguish between market distortions and the agent’s responses to
these distortions. This makes it rather impractical to study the effects of the various market
interventions. Instead of selecting from these two approaches, we apply a third option, which
we describe as kind of a middle course. By employing the Business Cycle Accounting (BCA)
approach as proposed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and revisited by Brinca, Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2016), we investigate the impact of the Great Recession during 2008
and 2009 in Germany, its aftermath, the impact of monetary policy, and in particular, the effects
of the German stimulus program.
The BCA framework is based on the benchmark Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, which
is extended by time-varying distortions in nearly every market, the so-called "prototype econ-
omy". Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) interpret the origins of these market distortions
as taxes, nominal and real frictions, changes in expectations, etc. and call them "wedges". In
contrast to most medium or large scale Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models,
the mechanisms underlying these distortions are not structural. They are parameterized like
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taxes, technology, or government spending and are driven by a reduced-form Markov process.1
Commonly this process is specified by a VAR(1). Using time series data one can estimate
the parameters of the VAR process and measure the values of the wedges. These measured
wedges are fed back into the model one by one, to assess the contribution of each wedge to the
business cycle. In a nutshell, BCA is the fully developed "...through the lens of a neoclassical
model"-approach.2 The slim theoretical framework and the applicability of classical estimation
techniques, in this instance maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE), minimizes the number of
assumptions required and thus the results are less assumption-driven. Nevertheless, one can
distinguish between market distortions and the agents responses.
To increase the practicability of BCA in general and make it more suitable for the study of the
German stimulus program in particular, we differ from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) in
our "prototype-economy", in our estimation methodology, and in our mapping strategy.
Prototype-economy: We extend the benchmark model for the following reasons in three ways.
First, the wedges include a long- and a short-run component. This allows to differentiate
between growth and business cycle accounting. Since the German reunification, subaggregates
of demand grew at different rates. Without growth accounting, the underlying stochastic process
is non-stationary. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) set a common growth rate unfoundedly
for all countries equal to 1.6 percent. Brinca, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2016) detrend
in such a way that the average trend-adjusted log output of the economy under consideration
is equal zero. The latter makes the estimation procedure more robust. Our approach can be
seen as a further stage.3 Second, we distinguish between government spending and net exports.
This enables a government spending analysis and accounts for the fact that German industry
is strongly depended on foreign trade. Third, we exclude durable consumption goods from
aggregated investment in order to consider the cash for clunkers program separately. After all,
the model includes the following wedges: government consumption, durables, investment, labor,
net exports, and efficiency. Previous work already extends the benchmark model in various ways,
e.g. Šustek (2011) includes an asset market and a monetary policy wedge.
Estimation: We estimate two structural parameters and all parameters of the VAR process using
MLE, in sum 59, and identify the wedges with Kalman-smoothing. MLE in this context is difficult,
e.g. Gerth and Otsu (2018) report unsolved problems concerning likelihood optimization and
BCA.4 As many others, they avoid the problem by switching to Bayesian estimation. As we argue,
Bayesian methods are impracticable for BCA, because the reduced-form process is highly abstract
and thus, it seems impossible to make any a-priori assumptions. Furthermore, Brinca, Iskrev,
and Loria (2018) argue that weak identification associated with parameters of the VAR process
is negligible in the context of BCA. Unfortunately, this does not hold for structural parameters.
We introduce a reliable and quick procedure to locate the maximum of the likelihood function.
Using this procedure, it is a feasible exercise to apply tools that help overcome problems of
weak identification, namely plotting the likelihood contour, detecting the global maximum, and
executing robustness checks, all with respect to the uncertain structural parameters.
The procedure can be summarized as follows: In advance, we make sure that all uncertain
parameters are locally strictly identified according to the strategy of Iskrev (2010). Then, we
1Note that Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009) argue that also some of the shocks in medium or large scale
DSGE models, i.e. New Keynesian models, are rather reduced-form than structural.
2This long-lasting approach was established by Solow (1957). To name but a few more recent applications: Kehoe
and Prescott (2002), Ohanian (2010), Lu (2012), Cho and Doblas-Madrid (2013), Karabarbounis (2014) or
Hansen and Ohanian (2016).
3Note that growth accounting is implicitly applied whenever different time series are detrended by univariate
filters, such as the HP-filter, the Hamilton filter or the Baxton-King filter. DeJong and Dave (2011, Chapter 6.1)
suggest a general procedure to estimate a common linear trend. Even by applying this strategy, the estimated
process lacks stationarity here.
4Gerth and Otsu (2018) do not account for growth, which potentially explains the problem.
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maximize the likelihood function, which we receive from a Kalman recursion, assuming that the
initial states are fixed and known in their long-run equilibrium. As Huber (2020) shows, this
initialization is in line with Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and provides two advantages,
i) the computation of the likelihood function can be vectorized and ii) an analytical and unique
solution exists for the maximizing conditional covariance matrix. Further, Huber (2020) proves
that the average of this likelihood function converges pointwise towards the average of a
likelihood function received from a Kalman recursion initialized with the unconditional first
and second moments. Thus, we use the first parameter estimation only as a guess for the actual
estimation based on the more common, unconditional likelihood function. As mentioned, we
complete the process by determining the wedges with Kalman-smoothing.
Mapping: Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) map different types of structural frictions
towards the reduced-form wedges, which they call "equivalent results". We map the particular
measures of the fiscal stimulus program and monetary policy in a similar manner and analyze
whether these interventions can explain counter-cyclical behavior. This follows Mulligan (2005)
who initiates the study of policy interventions as reduced-form errors of RBC models, and
Kersting (2008) who initiates the mapping of political measures, namely the 1980’s U.K. labor
market reforms, towards the wedges inside the BCA framework.
Our findings suggest that the crisis was mainly driven by the efficiency wedge, followed by the
net exports and the investment wedge. The government consumption wedge and especially the
durables wedge acted counter-cyclically. Furthermore, the labor wedge induced a fast recovery.
The results are robust except for the investment wedge.
We attribute the counter-cyclicality of the durables wedge to the cash for clunkers program,
which is equivalent to a durable good subsidy. Since the expenditures for government consump-
tion were higher than for the cash for clunkers program and the effects were similar, subsidies for
durable goods stimulated aggregated demand more efficiently. Mian and Sufi (2012) examine
the U.S. cash for clunkers program as a representative of durables and investment subsidies using
cross-section variation. They find that the program induced a large increase in car sales. Indeed,
in their study, the positive effect vanishes within one year due to intertemporal substitution.
In Germany, durable goods bust after the program, which suggest a similar substitution effect.
However, our BCA analysis indicates that this is the transmission towards the trajectory of
durables that would have occurred in the absence of the cash for clunkers program. In sum the
program’s effects are neither substituted entirely intra- nor intertemporally untill 2011-Q3. This
is at odds with the results of a times-series analysis by Leuwer and Süssmuth (2018), who find
large substitution effects. However, their work relies on the strong assumption that there were
no substantial changes simultaneously to the car subsidy. Berger and Vavra (2015) investigates
the households’ responses to durables subsidies over the business cycle for the U.S. and find
smaller effects in recessions, which is not at odds to our results, but make them more striking.
The labor market wedge induced recovery can be explained by expanded short-time work
possibilities as they can decrease hiring frictions in the aftermath of recessions. Using the
unemployment rate, Gehrke, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2019) argue that previous labor market
reforms (so-called Hartz reforms) probably drove the labor market wedge induced recovery. Our
method cannot distinguish between these explanations because both achieve equivalent results.
Similar interpretation problems concerning reduced-form shocks arise with measures of the
stimulus program which we map towards the efficiency, investment, and net exports wedge.
Since these wedges caused the crisis, pro-cyclical distortions exceed the effects of counter-cyclical
fiscal stimulus and monetary policy measures in those markets. Hence, pro-cyclical wedges
give no evidence for ineffective measures. Assuming that the fiscal stimulus program together
with monetary policy were the only counter-cyclical distortions, counter-cyclical wedges give
evidence for effective measures. Under this assumption, our results represent a lower bound for
the impact of fiscal and monetary policy measures and the pro-cyclical distortions.
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Existing BCA applications for the Great Recession in Germany by Brinca, Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2016) and Gerth and Otsu (2018) suggest negligible effects of the investment wedge
on the business cycle. Both treat durables and other investment goods as a composite. We
get similar results, feeding back both wedges at the same time into the model. In detail, the
pro-cyclicality of the investment wedge and the counter-cyclicality of the durables wedge offset
each other, which is why previous work potentially underrate the importance of the investment
wedge and, as a consequence, equivalent financial frictions.
Drygalla, Holtemoeller, and Kiesel (2018) as well as Gadatsch, Hauzenberger, and Stähler
(2016) investigate the German fiscal stimulus program in medium-scale New-Keynesian DSGE
models using Bayesian inference. They find positive but small effects on GDP and the latter
finds negative effects in the aftermath of the crisis. However, neither of these studies account
for durable consumption goods separately.
The remainder of the paper reads as follows. The next section sketches the German fiscal
stimulus program and the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Furthermore,
we provide long-term series with focus on the crisis from 2008 till 2011 for the reunified German
economy. Thereafter, we describe our version of a prototype economy. We map the single
measures of the program to the wedges. In a next step, we present our calibration exercises and
the estimation strategy. We show the results with a robustness and discussion section and then
the paper concludes. Our Appendix presents the entire model as well as the source of our data
and the corresponding manipulation.
4.2 The German case
4.2.1 The fiscal stimuli packages I and II in detail
The German fiscal stimulus program was composed of two packages. The first became effective
at the end of 2008 and the second at the beginning of 2009 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2008, 2009).
As Rosenberger (2013) describes, the first package amounted to 32 Billion € plus a loan
program of 15 Billion €. The fiscal stimulus consisted of a one year’s tax exemption on new
cars, higher tax deductions by permitting the reducing-balance method and increasing child
allowance, a lower employment insurance tax, as well as higher transfers for students and
retirees.
The second stimulus package amounted to 50 Billion€ plus both a loan and guarantee program
of 100 Billion€ and an increase of the German export credit guarantee program (Hermes cover)
of about 2 Billion €. The package consisted of investments in public infrastructure, financial
support for local and state authority spending, a subsidy on new cars at the amount of 2500 €
per car and in total 5 Billion €, subsidies for private innovations as well as lower income taxes
and social contributions. Short-time work possibilities and benefits were expanded, further
training was supported, and the Federal Employment Agency increased the number of job agents.
Table 4.1 presents following calculations by the OECD (2009) for the stimulus program. The
size of the fiscal stimulus program was on equal terms by reducing taxes and increasing transfers
and spending. Transfers to households amounted to 0.3 percent of GDP, where the cash for
clunkers composed two out of three. Extra government spending amounted to 0.8 percent of
GDP. The fiscal packages amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP, excluding all measures which did
not affected the national budget directly, e.g. the loan and guarantee program.
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Table 4.1: Composition of the fiscal program in percent of GDP
Tax
Individuals Social Contribution Business Total*
-0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -1.6
Spending
Transfers to households Transfers to business Government spending** Total***
0.3 0.3 0.8 1.6
Notes: * Including consumption tax measures. ** Final consumption + investment *** Including
transfers to sub-national government. Source: OECD (2009).
4.2.2 Monetary policy in the Great Recession
The monetary policy of the ECB also reacted to the recession. Figure 4.1 shows the minimum
bid rate on main refinancing operations and the interest rate on deposit facilities declined in the
aftermath of the declined inflation rate. The former declined from 4.25 percent in mid 2008 to
1 percent by mid 2009. Both interest rates have persisted since then.
Figure 4.1: Monetary policy and usage of the deposit facility




















Besides the conventional interest rate policy, the ECB applied further tools of monetary policy.
Here we give a short overview of the detailed reports of the European Central Bank (2010,
2011). In October 2008 the ECB switched from a variable-rate to a fixed-rate tender, eased
collateral requirements and enhanced the provision of liquidity. The ECB’s Governing Council
prolonged these measures several times. It decided to purchase bonds issued in the Euro area in
May 2009 and launched the Security Markets Program in June 2009. This program conducted
interventions on public and private debt securities markets in the Euro area. Then, in March
and May 2010, the Governing Council decided to switch back and forth between a variable-
and a fixed-rate tender and to intervene once again on the Euro area public and private debt
securities markets. The Council determined long-term refinance operations to provide liquidity
in August and October 2010.
4.2.3 Stylized facts for the German economy
Table 4.2 presents average long-run shares of subaggregates of the reunified German economy
(1991–2018). Private Consumption Expenditure (PCE) account for 56 percent, whereby durables
account for 6 percent and non-durables for the half of GDP. The share of investment is determined
at 21 percent and of government consumption close to 19 percent. Net exports account for
almost 4 percent.
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Table 4.2: Long-run ratios in percent of GDP (1991–
2018)
Description x t/GDPt






Source: See Appendix 4.C, own calculations.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the cyclical behavior of GDP, its subaggregates and hours worked.
The time series are the relative deviations from the concerning linear trend. We choose a linear
trend filter instead of the commonly used HP-filter to be consistent with our estimation strategy.5
We observe a boom-bust cycle in GDP at about the same time of the dot-com bubble. This
cycle was followed by a recovery from 2005 till 2008, which ended in a heavy drop. This drop
depicts the Great Recession. GDP recovered fast and has moved along the long-run trend since
then.
Figure 4.2: Cyclical behavior of GDP























Notes: The data is presented as relative deviations from linear trend. The light gray area indicates the crisis from
2008-Q1 – 2011-Q3, the dark gray area indicates the main effective period of the fiscal stimulus program 2008-Q4
– 2009-Q4. Source: see Appendix 4.C, own calculations.
Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 shows that investment has co-moved with GDP, but with a higher
volatility. Panel (b) displays two heavy short boom-bust-cycles of durables. The first peaked
at the end of 2006, shortly after the announcement of a value-added tax (VAT) increase. This
was followed by a bust at the beginning of 2007, when the increase took place. We observe
the second peak at the same time as the German cash for clunkers program, which was also
followed by a bust as the program expired. Government consumption was above its trend in the
middle and late 1990’s. It decreased at the beginning of the 2000’s and increased from 2008
till 2010. Since 2010 it has fluctuated around its trend. Non-durable consumption was below
its trend in the aftermath of the reunification, and was above the trend in the 2000’s until the
Great Recession and decreased slightly afterwards. Net exports relative to GDP decreased from
5Flor (2014) presents an overview of HP-filtered second moments of similar data.
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1997 till 2001 from their trend, and increased sharply afterwards till 2003. From then on until
the crisis they moved above the trend. Since the crisis they have fluctuated around the trend. In
the medium-run, hours worked declined after the German reunification till 2005 and from then
on they have increased. Hours worked have co-moved with GDP from 2000 onwards.
Figure 4.3: Cyclical behavior of different economic measures


















































































(e) Net exports to GDP










Notes: Despite hours worked, the data are presented as relative deviations from the corresponding linear trend.
Hours worked is the relative deviation from the average. The light gray area indicates the crisis from 2008-Q1 –
2011-Q3, the dark gray area indicates the main effective period of the fiscal stimulus program 2008-Q4 – 2009-Q4.
Source: see Appendix 4.C, own calculations.
The light gray area in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 indicates the Great Recession. GDP, hours worked
and investment decreased from the end of 2008 until the peak of the crisis in 2009-Q2 by 5
percentage points, 4 percentage points and 12 percentage points, respectively. Their recovery
completed in 2011. Durables increased during the time of the car subsidy – indicated through
the dark gray area – by 12 percentage points and decreased by 18 percentage points afterwards.
Durables recovered at the end of 2010. Government consumption increased at the beginning of
2009 by 5 percentage points and remained till the end of 2011 by 4 percentage points above its
trend. Non-durables were less than 2 percent below their trend at the end of 2009 and recovered
fast.




4.3.1 The prototype economy
The prototype economy consists of an infinitely-lived household, a firm facing perfect competition,
and a government which finances its expenditures by levying taxes on labor, durables, and
investment. The model of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) is extended in three ways. First,
we distinguish between government spending and net exports and second, exclude durables
from aggregated investment goods. Both enable a deeper analysis of the stimulus program
and the former allows to account for the strong export-dependency of the German economy.
Third, wedges consist of a growth and a business cycle part. This allows separate procedures for
growth and business cycle accounting and ensures stationarity of the stochastic process. The
model also accounts for productive capital and durable consumption capital adjustment costs.
Chang (2000) shows that adjustment costs for capital goods in the market and at home solves
problems with excess volatility and negative co-movements, because adjustment costs lower the
substitutability, which is why we model this structural friction explicitly. The model is written in
per capita terms.
4.3.1.1 Model
The per period utility of the representative household is parameterized as follows
u (Ct , Dt , Nt) =
(
φ ln(Ct) + (1−φ) ln(KDt) +ψ ln (1− Nt) for η= 1,

Cφt ·K1−φDt ·(1−Nt )ψ
1−η−1
1−η for η 6= 1,
(4.3.1)
where Ct denotes consumption of non-durable goods and Nt is the household’s labor supply.
The stock of durable consumption goods KDt accumulates according to



















where γn denotes the population growth factor, Dt are investments in durable consumption
goods, and bD is the ratio of investment in durables to the stock of durables in the long run. The






su (Ct+s, KDt+s, Nt+s) (4.3.3)
subject to the budget constraint
Ct + (1+τI t)PI t It + (1+τDt)PDt Dt ≤ Rt KI t + (1−τN t)Wt Nt + Tt − PEt Et , (4.3.4)
where KI t denotes the productive capital stock (capital stock hereafter), It investment in capital,
Tt lump-sum transfers, Et net exports, Rt the rental rate on capital, and Wt the real wage. The
tax rates τN t , τI t and τDt are used to model wedges in the labor, investment and durables
market. PEt , PI t and PDt are the relative prices for net exports, investment, and durable goods
and reflects the wedges’ long-run element. The consumption good is the numeraire. The capital
stock follows the law-of-motion
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with bI as the investment-to-capital ratio in the long run.







and faces perfect competition. The parameter γz denotes the growth factor of labor augmenting
technical progress and Zt the efficiency wedge.
The government expenditures Gt are exogenous and the government chooses lump-sum
transfers Tt , so that its budget constraint
PGt Gt + Tt ≤ τN tWt Nt +τI t PI t It +τDt PDt Dt (4.3.7)
always binds. Thereby, the resource constraint of the economy is
Yt = Ct + PI t It + PDt Dt + PGt Gt + PEt Et . (4.3.8)
Growth component: As already mentioned, the population grows with γn and technical progress
with γz. Furthermore, the wedges evolve differently. The relative prices reflect this. In the long
run PX t ∈ {PI t , PDt , PGt , PEt} evolves with PX t = gPX PX t−1. The ensuing trend growth factors of





Table 4.3: Growth factors
X t Yt Ct Wt Tt It KI t Rt Dt KDt Gt Et γz Nt PX t






I 1 gPX =
gY
gX
Business cycle component: The VAR(1)-process
st+1 = Πst + εt+1, εt ∼N (0,Σ), (4.3.9)
drives the fluctuation of the model, where
st =






εAt εN t εI t εDt εEt εGt
T
.
The stochastic process affects the wedges as follows
Zt = A
∗ · sAt , τN t = τ∗N + sN t , τI t = τ∗I + sI t ,
τDt = τ
∗
D + sDt , et = e
∗ + sEt , gt = g
∗ · sGt ,





∗ and g∗ are the corresponding steady-state component of the different
distortions. Similar to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), we define the six wedges as follows:
The efficiency wedge Zt , the net export wedge et , the government spending wedge gt , the labor
wedge 1−τN t , the investment wedge 11+τI t , and the durables wedge
1
1+τDt
. The latter two are
defined so that, similar to the labor market wedge, increases act like subsidies and decreases
like taxes in comparison to the steady-state value. Since the cyclical component includes the
steady-state component, detrended prices pEt , pGt , pI t , pDt are normed to one. We present in
Appendix 4.A the full dynamic equilibrium of the model with stationary variables.
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Solution: To derive the model’s decision rules, we use a linear perturbation method. In detail,
we apply the method of undetermined coefficients as Uhlig (1999) and Christiano (2002)
describe to solve the log-linearized model. The solved model then can be written as
yt = L
y
x · xt + Lys · st, (4.3.10)
ct = L
c
x · xt + Lcs · st, (4.3.11)
xt+1 = L
x
x · xt + Lxs · st, (4.3.12)
where the matrices L·xcharacterize the policy function of the deterministic part of the model’s
solution, while L·s describe the policy function of the stochastic part. With x̂ t = ln(x t)− ln(x) as
the approximation of the relative deviation of a variable x t from its steady state value x , the
vector of observables is yt =





, while ct denotes the vector of unobserved




the vector of endogenous states.6
4.3.1.2 Mapping
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), Brinca, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2016), and various
other authors map structural models into their prototype economy. Nutahara and Inaba (2012)
apply BCA for misspecified wedges and find they are able to approximate the true wedges and
the corresponding response of the agents adequately. We show first how to map the stimulus
program to the prototype economy. Since the wedges’ drivers are modeled as taxes, this is
straightforward for most of the measures. Secondly, we reflect monetary policy.
Mapping the stimulus program
Government Wedge: We assign total government spending to the government spending wedge.
These are mainly investments in infrastructure and financial support for local and state authority
spending. Hence, the stimulus program increases the government wedge directly.
Durables Wedge: The two measures concerning new cars affect the durables wedge. For a
given producer price, both measures reduce the absolute tax or the relative price of durables
from the households perspective. Hence, they increase the durables wedge.
Investment Wedge: The first part of the stimulus program which affects the investment wedge
are subsidies for investments in innovations. The second are increased tax deductions by allowing
for a reducing-balance method. For given producer prices, absolute taxes or the relative price of
investment decreases and thus the investment wedge increases.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) show how to map financial frictions in terms of a financial
accelerator and Brinca, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2016) show how to map financial frictions
in terms of collateral constraints into a prototype economy with an investment wedge. The
loan and guarantee program lowers financial frictions, in particular they mitigate the banks’
collateral constraints. Following this, the loan and guarantee program also raises the investment
wedge.
Labor Wedge: The stimulus program loweres income tax and social contribution, this increases
the labor wedge in general.
Brinca, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2016) show the link between a prototype economy
with efficiency and labor wedges and an economy with search and matching frictions. The
mentioned labor market actions, e.g. expanded short-time work, reduce such frictions and thus,
increase the labor market wedge. The effects should be delayed in time due to lower hiring
frictions in the aftermath of the crisis.
6The use of Òetyt instead of êt is discussed in 4.3.2.2.
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Efficiency Wedge: Due to the labor market actions in the previous paragraph, the efficiency
wedge increases also due to a better matching. Further, the expanded short-time work possi-
bilities reduce labor hoarding, since the firm can both retain employees to lower future hiring
frictions and adjust hours worked. As a consequence, the efficiency wedge increases.
As shown by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), input-financing frictions are associated
with efficiency wedges. These frictions appear when firms must borrow for an input good and
some firms are financially more constrained than others. Such firms have to pay higher interest
rates. The loan and guarantee program lowers financial constraints and thus increases the
efficiency wedge.
Net exports: The increase in Hermes coverage advances the conditions for exports. Neverthe-
less, the effects are probably only rather small.
Mapping monetary policy
Government Wedge: Purchasing bonds lowers the bonds’ interest rates and this lowers the
costs of debt-financed government spending, which may indirectly increase the government
wedge.
Durables Wedge: Since refinancing is cheaper, for a given real rate of return, investment
increases. Hence, monetary policy changes the intertemporal decision of a household, which
is reflected in a higher durables wedge. Furthermore, provision of liquidity also changes the
intertemporal decisions of liquidity constrained households, which also reflects in a higher
durables wedge.
Investment Wedge: Both mentioned effects of the durables wedge have the same effect on the
investment wedge. The provision of liquidity and cheaper refinancing lowers frictions in the
investment market.
As already mentioned, Brinca, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2016) show how to map an
economy with a collateral constrained bank into a the prototype economy with an investment
wedge. Lower collateral constraints lower frictions in the investment market. Thus, the slacked
collateral requirements by the ECB increase the investment wedge.
Efficiency Wedge: As mentioned above, input-financing frictions are associated with efficiency
wedges (see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007). The friction appears when firms must borrow
for input goods and some firms are financially more constrained than others. Those firms have
to pay higher interest rates. The Security Markets Program can lower these frictions and thus,
increases the efficiency.
4.3.1.3 Calibration
We estimate the elasticity, ηI =
I
KI
Φ′′I , of the price of capital with respect to the investment to
capital ratio as well as the elasticity, ηD =
D
KD
Φ′′D, of the price of the stock of durables with respect
to the new durables to stock of durables ratio in addition to the parameters that characterize
the stochastic process st. The remaining parameters are calibrated as follows:
The capital elasticity α is set to 0.34. Flor (2014) calculates this as the German capital share
from 1991 to 2012. In line with Heer and Maussner (2009, Chapter 1.5), Flor (2014) also
provides the discount parameter β = 0.994 for the German economy. We pin down the annual
rate of capital depreciation at the average ratio of gross fixed capital formation and the net stock
of fixed assets. The average quarterly capital depreciation rate arises from δI = 1−(1−δI ,annual)
1
4 .
In the same manner the rate of durables depreciation δD is computed.
The choice ofψ,φ and η, which characterize the household’s preferences, is more problematic.
Forψ and η we follow the baseline calibration from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and fix
ψ at 2.24 and η at 1. We calibrate the preference weight of durables φ by matching the durable
to non-durable consumption ratio with the long-run marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and durables. We do not estimate the steady-state values of the different wedges.
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Instead, we compute them from the model’s static equilibrium equations in line with Lama
(2011). We fix the steady-state values of output, government consumption, investment in capital
as well as in durables to their average shares of output (see Table 4.2). The steady-state labor
supply N is 0.122, which equals the average share of hours worked on the available time budget
of a household.7 Our calibration exercises are summarized in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Calibration of the model
Parameter Description Value
α capital share 0.34
β discount factor 0.994
δI rate of capital depreciation 0.017
δD rate of durables depreciation 0.045
ψ preference weight of labor 2.24
φ preference weight of consumption 0.879
η risk aversion 1
4.3.1.4 Identification
We check our prototype economy for strict local identification following Iskrev (2010), who
shows that a linearized DSGE model with normally distributed shocks is locally identified for a
given set of parameters, if the Jacobian matrix of theoretical first and second moments with
respect to these parameters has full rank. To check the identifiability over a sufficiently large
parameter space we draw 1,000,000 times from the following distributions for the elasticities of
the adjustment costs ηD, ηI , for the the off-diagonals πi j, i 6= j of Π, for the diagonals πii of Π,
and the elements bi j, i ≤ j of the lower triangular matrix B with Σ= BBT :
ηD,ηI ∼ U(0, 4), πi j ∼N (0, 0.1), πii ∼N (0.8, 0.1), bi j ∼ U(−0.05, 0.05).
The Jacobian of the first and second moments (up to two lags) has full rank at approximately
99.9 percent of the draws. Thus, the model is virtually identifiable in the chosen parameter
space.8
Brinca, Iskrev, and Loria (2018) provide and apply strategies for identification strength. They
show that weak identification of the stochastic process’ parameters is secondary, but this does
not hold for structural ones. To address this problem, we compute the likelihood surface of the
uncertain deep parameters ηD and ηI to detect a global maximum as well as the likelihood’s
curvature and execute robustness checks in section 4.4.
4.3.2 The business cycle accounting procedure
The BCA procedure is divided into three separate steps: The estimation of the parameters, the
identification of the wedge states, and the assessment of the contribution of a single wedges
towards the business cycle.
MLE determines the matrices Π and Σ that characterize the stochastic process st as well
as the elasticities ηI and ηD that define the level of adjustment costs. Full-information esti-
mation of DSGE models is typically done with Bayesian methods, although MLE involves less
7Here we follow (Heer and Maussner, 2009, Chapter 1.5), who assume that the household’s maximum working
hours amount to 1, 440= 16 hours per day×90 days per quarter.
8In comparison, we proceed similarly for the benchmark economy of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007)
presented in Appendix 4.B. The Jacobian of the first and second moments (up to two lags) has no full rank at
26 parameter draws from 1,000,000.
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assumptions. Applying Bayesian estimation is usually meaningful, since the researcher has a
structural parametrization in mind and, by association, an idea of probable parameter values.
We would like to stress that the application of BCA requires MLE and any restrictions like the
Bayesian approaches, such as Otsu (2010), Chakraborty and Otsu (2013) or Plotnikov (2017) are
questionable. The wedges are superpositions and interactions of a variety of market distortions
with an underlying reduced-form stochastic process, which complicates the interpretation of
the Markov transitions. Furthermore, recall the findings of Nutahara and Inaba (2012) that the
VAR(1) strips a potentially more sophisticated stochastic process down. Thus, the estimated
parameters are only pseudo-true for the real model. As a consequence, in general the values of
the process’ parameters cannot be interpreted, and a-priori assumptions of them are meaningless,
and even more seriously, may restrict the set of mappable models. Thus, we make a point for
MLE and let the data speak through an unrestricted VAR.9
After all parameters are pinned down, either by calibration or MLE, we use a state-smoothing
algorithm as described in Durbin and Koopman (2012, Chapter 4.4) to predict the wedge’s
states st.
In a last step, in line with Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), we feed the wedges separately
back into the model, while others are set constant, to assess the contribution of each wedge to
the quantities of interest.10
4.3.2.1 MLE
To evaluate the likelihood function of the linear state-space model (4.3.9)–(4.3.12), most of the




T (see e.g. DeJong and Dave, 2011, Chapter 8.4)). However, for an asymptotic




conditional on a observed set of data {y1, . . . ,yt} converges to a matrix P, the steady-state MSE,
as t goes to infinity.11 Exploiting this property, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) use the
steady-state MSE P instead of the unconditional variance to initialize their Kalman-recursion.
As pointed out by Huber (2020), it can be shown that the steady-state MSE P is equal zero in
standard DSGE models like the one presented here.12 To get the intuition behind the result and
for the sake of simplicity, let us consider the case without growth and with zero adjustment
costs. In this case, equations (4.3.2) and (4.3.5) rewrite to





(1−δX )iX t−i + (1−δX )t KX1, X ∈ {I , D}.
Imagine we observe the investment X i ∈ {I , D} in capital and in durables for all i = 1, . . . , t.
Assuming that KX1 is normally distributed with variance σ
2
X , the variance of KX t+1 conditional on{X1, . . . , X t} yields (1−δX )2tσ2X . Since δI ,δD ∈ (0, 1], it is straightforward that the uncertainty
regarding the endogenous states xt disappears as t goes to infinity. Furthermore, assuming L
y
s is
9We would like to point out two technical issues regarding Bayesian methods and BCA. First, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no prior that includes all combination parameter values that generate eigenvalues of Π
less than one and excludes all combinations that do not have these properties. Second, the posteriors of a
VAR-driven DSGE model can be multi-modal. This makes the commonly used RWMH algorithms unsuitable.
For a deeper discussion and solution for the latter issue, see Herbst and Schorfheide (2015, Chapter 5, 6.1)
10See the technical appendix by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) for more details.
11For a formal proof, see e.g. Hamilton (1994, Chapter 13).




γn·gI ∈ [0,1) our prototype economy satisfies the preconditions of
Proposition 1 by Huber (2020).
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yt − Lyx · xt

. (4.3.1)
Thus, as the uncertainty of the endogenous states xt disappears as t goes to infinity, the uncer-
tainty over the exogenous states st disappears as well. Using a Kalman-recursion initialized at
the steady-state, with the steady-state MSE P is therefore equivalent to the assumption that the
initial state vector is fixed and known, [xT0 s
T
0]
T = 0nx+ns×1. Huber (2020) elaborates two major
advantages of a fixed and known initialization at the long-run equilibrium. First, the likelihood
evaluation can be vectorized and more important, it provides an analytical solution of the MLE
for Σ since we can observe the residuals εt independently of Σ.
14 The solution of the MLE for Σ








(st −Π · st−1) · (st −Π · st−1)T

, s0 = 0ns×1. (4.3.2)
The estimates of a standard Kalman-recursion, which is initialized at the unconditional first and
second moments, are more natural, since the initial states are usually unknown. Huber (2020)
however shows that the average likelihood of the steady-state Kalman-recursion converges
pointwise to the average likelihood of the standardly initialized Kalman-recursion. Therefore,
we use the estimates of the steady-state Kalman-recursion as the initial guess for a second
estimation, where we initialize the Kalman-recursion with the unconditional first and second
moments.
4.3.2.2 Data manipulation
The observables are GDP, investment, durables, government expenditures, net exports to GDP,
and hours worked. Regressions with the logarithm of the first four observables as dependent
variable and time as independent variable provide necessary components. The coefficient
estimates determine the growth rates and the residuals the relative deviation from the particular
growth path. Negative values for net exports prevent logarithmization. A regression with
net exports relative to GDP as dependent variable and time as independent variable provides
auxiliary variables. The coefficient is the excess growth rate of net exports compared to GDP
growth. The residuals are the deviation from the long-run net exports to GDP rate, which
is computable in the model. The residuals of these regressions are used for business cycle
accounting, the coefficients for growth accounting.
Since hours worked per capita do not include a trend, the relative deviations from the long-run
average are used for business cycle accounting. Whereas growth accounting is of course not
applicable in this manner.
For a detailed data source, see Appendix 4.C.
13Huber (2020) discusses how to deal with cases where Lys is singular. However, this case never occurred in our
analysis.
14Huber (2020) presents a detailed and more general version, Monte Carlo studies and further applications of this
approach.





Table 4.5 presents the growth rates of the observables. The GDP annual trend growth rate is
1.32 percent. The amount of durables and investment goods grows slower than GDP, while net
exports grow faster. Government consumption grows similar to GDP.
Table 4.5: Growth accounting
Parameter Description Value
ln(γ4n) annual growth rate of population 0.03%
ln(g4Y ) annual growth rate of GDP 1.32%
ln(g4I ) annual growth rate of investment 0.93%
ln(g4D) annual growth rate of durables 0.35%
ln(g4G) annual growth rate of gov. cons. 1.40%
ln(g4E) annual growth rate of net exports 1.65%
Similar to the shocks which drive the business cycle, the long-run components of the wedges
Px t and γz are reduced-form. Since we focus on the business cycle, we discuss only briefly
potential causes for different growth rates. Differences in the long-run component of the durables
and the investment wedge (PDt , PI t) may occur due to investment-specific technological change
as described by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997). The increase in German net exports
since the launch of the Euro is investigated by in’t Veld, Vogel, Ratto, Kollmann, and Roeger
(2014). The most important factors, summed up in PEt , are: A higher German savings rate,
positive supply shocks, especially due to labor market reforms, as well as a higher demand for
German goods of non Euro area members.
Figure 4.4: Maximum-Likelihood-Estimation












(a) Log-Likelihood (without constant)














(b) Correlation between εI t and εDt
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Table 4.6: Estimation of exogenous shock process
Autoregressive Matrix
Π ln(sA) sN sI sD sE ln(sG)
ln(sA) 0.90 0.41 0.00 0.07 -0.21 -0.16
sN 0.01 0.83 0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -.01
sI 0.70 -1.71 0.96 -0.52 1.44 1.07
sD 0.27 -0.05 -0.00 0.66 0.16 -0.01
sE 0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.62 -0.12
ln(sG) -0.05 0.17 -0.01 -0.05 -0.22 0.80
Correlation and standard errors
Corr(εi,ε j) εA εN εI εD εE εG 100 · StD(εi)
εA 1.00 0.94
εN 0.03 1.00 0.34
εI -0.49 -0.06 1.00 7.12
εD 0.27 -0.83 0.13 1.00 1.44
εE 0.31 0.70 -0.02 -0.36 1.00 0.59
εG -0.10 0.13 -0.19 -0.16 -0.13 1.00 0.80
4.4.2 Estimation
As already mentioned, the MLE includes Π, Σ, ηD and ηI . Panel 4.4(a) illustrates the likelihood
function with respect to ηD and ηI , while Π and Σ are the argument maximum of the function
for given ηI and ηD. The panel identifies two local maxima. The global is at ηD = 0.19 and
ηI = 3.00.
Table 4.6 presents the estimates for the autoregressive matrix Π as well as second moments
of the innovations εi. All wedges are highly autoregressive. The investment wedge depends
heavily on the other wedges with one lag. The innovations of the investment wedge have the
highest volatility and are negatively correlated with the efficiency wedge. There is also a strong
negative correlation between the innovations of the durables and the labor wedge. The net
export wedge’s innovation correlates with the labor wedge.
Panel 4.4(b) illustrates that the innovations of durables and investments are perfectly cor-
related in the absence of adjustment costs. Fehrle (2019) investigates different investment
goods, vector-autoregressive processes and adjustment costs in detail and argues that adjustment
costs can be viewed as a underpinning mechanism of reduced-form correlated shocks. Here,
e.g. the mentioned high substitutability between durables and investments is prevented either
by perfect correlated innovations, adjustment costs or a nest of them. Hence, it is useless to
separate investments and durables without adjustment costs, since the corresponding wedges
must co-move. Otherwise, as a result of Chang (2000), the high substitutability would lead to
an excessive volatility of durables and investments and negative co-movements between them.
However, this is contradicted by the data.
4.4.3 Business Cycle Accounting for the Great Recession and the German
fiscal stimulus program, 2008-Q1 – 2011-Q3
The graphical analysis of our BCA exercise is reported in Figure 4.5. In Panels 4.5(a) to 4.5(e)
we confront the observations of GDP, its subaggregates and hours worked with the model’s
prediction when only one wedge is allowed to fluctuate.
Panel 4.5(a) illustrates that the crisis was mainly driven by the efficiency wedge. The invest-
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ment and net exports wedge also contributed to the crisis. These three wedges together induced
the decrease in GDP. The labor wedge contributed to the crisis from 2009-Q2 to 2009-Q4. Before,
the wedge was counter-cyclical and afterwards it introduced the recovery. The durables wedge
and government consumption were anti-cyclical. Panel 4.5(b) illustrates that the investment
wedge drove the decline in investment mostly, while the efficiency wedge mattered little. The
efficiency wedge influenced durables negatively as Panel 4.5(c) shows. The durables wedge on
its own increased durables up to almost 50 percent in 2009. Afterwards, the wedge only had a
slight impact. Panel 4.5(d) indicates that the efficiency wedge caused the decline in non-durable
consumption mostly and the labor wedge partly. The durables and government consumption
wedge had little impact on non-durable consumption. Panel 4.5(e) predicts the decline in net
exports to GDP and the investment wedge introduced the decline in hours worked. The labor
market wedge drove the decline between 2009-Q2 and 2009-Q4. Besides, the labor wedge was
counter-cyclical. The other wedges were counter-cyclical. Theory teaches us that the wedges
of both investment goods Dt and It react similar to monetary policy and financial frictions in
general.15 Thus, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and many others aggregate them. The
business investment wedge drove the decline in business investment during the crisis. Financial
frictions and other distortions dominated the fiscal and monetary policy measures. This is not
true for durables. The only appreciable difference between the wedges during the crises were the
car subsidies. Further, the positive impact of the durables wedge occurred simultaneously with
the subsidies. The wedge began to stimulate the demand of durable goods with the introduction
of the tax exemption for new cars in 2008-Q4. In 2009-Q1 the cash for clunkers program started,
while the stimulating effect increased strongly. The stimulus disappeared between 2009-Q4 and
2010-Q1 while the last pay-off took place in 2009-Q4. Hence, we attribute the large increase
due to the durables wedge to the car subsidies and can map changes due to the durables as well
as government spending wedge to the fiscal stimulus program. The measures in other markets
are dominated by frictions. Thus, it is unfortunately impossible to give statements about the
measures with the chosen method.
With respect to GDP and hours, we find that the stimulus program due to the durables
subsidies and government consumption had a positive effect during the crisis. The model
predicts an approximately 2 percent bigger decline in GDP and an approximately 3.5 percent
bigger decline in hours without changes in those wedges during the peak of the crisis (2009-
Q2). Regarding non-durable consumption and investment the effect of the stimulus program is
negative. Nevertheless, during the crisis the stimulus of durables and government consumption
increased GDP and was not completely substituted by lower investments and non-durable
consumption. Intertemporal substitution of durables investment in the aftermath of the program
was small. The bust was driven by the efficiency wedge, which depressed durables over the
whole period. The durables wedge virtually did not influence GDP negatively from 2008-Q1 till
2011-Q3.
The labor market wedge mitigated the crisis at the beginning and the end of the crisis. In
particular at the end of the crisis, the model predicts an increase of more than 2 percent in GDP
and more than 3 percent in hours worked.
The measurement ωi quantifies the contribution of each wedge to GDP during the Great
15Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) report for the U.S. financial frictions during the Great Recession a big negative
impact on the durables market. Benmelech, Meisenzahl, and Ramcharan (2017) explain one third of the decline
in the U.S. car demand by frictions on the asset-backed commercial paper market. The decline in U.S. house
prices weakens the household balance sheets, which also had a negative effect on the U.S. auto market, as
shown by Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013).
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Figure 4.5: BCA - Results
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Notes: Dashed lines for GDP, investment, durables and hours are the data and the model’s outcome. Here they are
equivalent. The dashed lines for non-durable consumption is only the model’s outcome. The gray area indicates
the main effective period of the fiscal stimulus program 2008-Q4 – 2009-Q4.














t − ŷ jt )
with i, j ∈ {sA, sN , sI , sD, sG, sE}, t ∈ [2008-Q1, ..., 2011-Q3],
where ŷGDPt is the GDP when all wedges are non-changing and ŷ
i
t is the model outcome of
wedge i alone. Thus, the contribution of all wedges together sums to 1, while the sign of ωi
points out if wedge i has mitigated (−) or amplified (+) a crisis.
The efficiency wedge accounts for 62 percent of the decline in GDP during this period, net
exports for 26 percent, the investment wedge for 19 percent, and the labor market accounts
for 3 percent. Government consumption accounts for -5 percent and the durables wedge for -4
percent. Since the effect of the durables wedge during the durables subsidies was at least twice
as large as the effect of government consumption and effects throughout the whole crisis were
similar but expenditures for these subsidies only made up for about 25 percent of the increase
of government consumption, durables subsidies were more efficient to stimulate aggregated
demand than government consumption.
With the identifying assumption that the fiscal stimulus program together with monetary
policy were the only counter-cyclical distortions, our results represent a lower bound for the
impact of fiscal and monetary policy measures as well as for the pro-cyclical distortions.
4.4.4 Robustness and discussion
Robustness in parameters. The results depend potentially on the values of adjustment costs
ηI , ηD and on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution η. To evaluate the sensitivity, we
calculate ωi over a grid of the mentioned parameters. Therefore, we reestimate the (remaining)
uncertain parameters at each node of the parameter grid.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the contribution of the concerning wedges for different amounts of
adjustment costs. The efficiency wedge contributed the most to the decline in GDP, followed by
net export for the whole set of adjustment costs. The results for the labor market wedge and
government consumption are robust as well. The durables wedge mitigated the crisis for most of
the parameter combinations. The contribution would have been pro-cyclical without adjustment
costs. As mentioned above, in the absence of adjustment costs a separation of the durables and
investment wedge is meaningless. The investment wedge’s contribution to the crisis would have
been negative for ηI < 1/3 where the likelihood is the lowest (see Panel 4.4(a)) and positive
otherwise.
Subsidies in durables change the intertemporal rate of substitution. Hence, a robustness
check to the elasticity of the substitution rate is relevant. Figure 4.7 presents the contribution
to the decline in GDP over η. The contributions of the labor, investment, durables and the
government consumption wedge are nearly constant. The contribution of net exports declines
with a higher elasticity, nevertheless they contributed the second most over the whole domain.
The contribution of the efficiency wedge increases with η.
Robustness regarding the benchmark model. The assessment of the joint contribution of
the investment and durables wedge as well as the joint contribution of government consumption
and net exports maps our economy into the benchmark BCA economy ex post. The left panel
of Figure 4.8 illustrates these effects. The right panel plots the impact of the investment and
government spending wedge in the Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) benchmark economy,
where durables and investment as well as government spending and net exports are aggregated
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Figure 4.6: Adjustment costs specific wedge contribution
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Figure 4.7: Inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution specific wedge contribution
















ex ante.16 The results are similar, except in the more detailed economy the investment wedge
was slightly counter-cyclical during the cash for clunkers program. Thus, the results of the
detailed model are not counterfactual to the benchmark BCA model, but provide deeper insights.
Although the impact of the composed investment wedge was negligible during the Great
Recession, our results suggest that the decomposed wedges were not. The pro-cyclical effect
of the investment wedge and the policy-driven counter-cyclical effect of durables wedge offset
each other. Hence, without our decomposition the importance of the investment wedge and, by
association, the importance of financial frictions during the Great Recession is underrated. For
example, the financial frictions of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), or Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) are equivalent to the
investment wedge.
Figure 4.8: Robustness to the Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) benchmark economy
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(b) Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) - Bench-
mark Economy
Comparing two durables boom-bust cycles. As mentioned, there were two boom-bust cycles
in the durables market. We compare them in Figure 4.9. Panels 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) show the data
and the impact of the durables wedge on durables from 2008-Q1 to 2010-Q4 and from 2006-Q1
to 2007-Q4. The durables wedge accounts during the car subsidies programs for the boom, but
only marginally for the bust afterwards. During 2006 a VAT increase announcement passed the
institutions and at this time durables investments increased. The introduction of the increase
16Appendix 4.B sketches the model and provides our estimation strategy and results for the Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2007) benchmark economy of the presented time series.
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was in 2007-Q1, when the bust took place. The durables wedge caused the whole boom-bust
cycle and illustrates intratemporal substitution.


























(b) VAT increase with announcement
4.5 Conclusion
We use the BCA analysis to investigate the impact of the German stimulus program during the
Great Recession from 2008-Q1 to 2011-Q3. We extended the prototype economy by two wedges.
Wedges correspond to the following variables: government consumption, durables, investment,
labor, net exports, and efficiency. To account for the fiscal stimulus we map fiscal and monetary
policy towards these wedges, thus enabling a policy evaluation.
We introduce two procedures that enable a fast and reliable MLE and the application of
tools which help to overcome problems of weak identification. The first procedure separates
between growth and business cycle accounting which ensures the stationarity of the underlying
stochastic process. The second procedure is a new strategy to find a good guess for the argument
maximum of the likelihood function. The applicability of MLE is crucial for, and one of the
major advantages of BCA at the same time. Since MLE is difficult, and so Bayesian methods or
other restrictions towards the stochastic process are used for BCA, we hope to give new impetus
to the use of MLE and BCA with both procedures.
In our BCA analysis we find that the Great Recession in Germany was mainly driven by the
efficiency wedge, net exports, and the investment wedge. In contrast, the durables and the
government spending wedge acted counter-cyclical. We argue that the latter two collect parts of
the German stimulus. The labor market wedge was pro-cyclical between 2009Q2 and 2009-Q4,
besides it mitigated the crisis and especially induced the recovery. Due to higher expenditures
for government consumption and a similar impact compared to the cash for clunkers program,
subsidies for durable goods stimulated aggregated demand more efficiently. We check the
robustness of our results to different choices of parameters that determine the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution as well as capital and durables adjustment costs. We find that our
results are robust for all wedges except the investment wedge. However, the results indicate that
previous studies underrate the negative impact of the investment wedge and, as a consequence,
the role of investment wedge equivalent financial frictions. We have to mention that BCA is only
a first but useful step for the identification of market distortions, and thus we aim to motivate
further research on the efficiency of durable goods’ subsidies, the role of financial frictions
during the Great Recession and the labor market driven recovery in Germany.
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Appendix
4.A Model
The following equations determine the model with stationary variables
yt = k
α





















yt = ct + it + dt + gt + et , (4.A.6)








gI · γnkI t+1 = (1−δI)kI t + it −ΘI t · kI t , (4.A.9)
gD · γnkDt+1 = (1−δD)kDt + dt −ΘDt · kDt , (4.A.10)































Y · g(1−φ)(1−η)D · g−1I , (4.A.13)
gMD = g
φ(1−η)
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with X ∈ {I , D}, x ∈ {i, d} and where ∗ indicates the steady-state value. The fluctuation in the





































































, εt ∼N (0,Σ). (4.A.18)
The stochastic process affects the wedges as follows
Zt = A
∗ · sAt , (4.A.19)
τN t = τ
∗
N + sN t , (4.A.20)
τI t = τ
∗
I + sI t , (4.A.21)
τDt = τ
∗
D + sDt , (4.A.22)
et = e
∗ + sEt , (4.A.23)
gt = g
∗ · sGt . (4.A.24)





















yt = ct + it + gt , (4.B.6)




gI · γnkt+1 = (1−δI)kt + it −ΘI t · kt , (4.B.8)


































where ∗ indicates the steady-state value.
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, εt ∼N (0,Σ). (4.B.14)
The stochastic process affects the wedges as follows
Zt = A
∗ · sAt , (4.B.15)
τN t = τ
∗
N + sN t , (4.B.16)
τI t = τ
∗
I + sI t , (4.B.17)
gt = g
∗ · sGt . (4.B.18)
4.B.2 Observables and data manipulation
The vector of observables reads as follows yt =

ŷt N̂t ît ĝt
T
. In contrast to our modified
model government consumption is the sum of government consumption and net exports and
investments are the sum of durables and investments.
4.B.3 Calibration and estimation
The calibration and estimation strategy is similar to our modified model. We estimate the
elasticity of the price of capital ηI as well as the parameters of the stochastic process. All other
parameters are calibrated and the long-run ratios are pined down to their long-run averages.
Tables 4.B1 and 4.B2 present all relevant parameters.
Table 4.B1: Calibration and growth accounting for the Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) economy
Parameter description Value
α capital share 0.34
β discount factor 0.994
δI rate of capital depreciation 0.0203
ψ preference weight of labor 2.24
η risk aversion 1
ηI elasticity of the price of capital 0.86
ln(γ4n) annual growth rate of population 0.03%
ln(g4Y ) annual growth rate of GDP 1.32%
ln(g4I ) annual growth rate of investment 0.79%
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Table 4.B2: Estimation of exogenous shock process of the Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) economy
Autoregressive Matrix
Π ln(sA) sN sI ln(sG)
ln(sA) 0.93 0.09 0.05 −0.03
sN −0.01 0.73 0.04 −0.00
sI 0.03 2.03 0.67 −0.02
ln(sG) 0.09 −1.17 0.08 0.84
Correlation and standard errors
Corr(εi,ε j) εA εN εI εG 100 · StD(εi)
εA 1.00 0.94
εN 0.21 1.00 0.29
εI −0.27 −0.61 1.00 1.77
εG 0.43 0.77 −0.34 1.00 2.71
4.C Data
The data is taken from the Fachserie 18: National accounts, domestic product from the German
Federal Statistical Office.
• Pop: Total Population 1991:I-2018:I
Source: 2.1.7 Population and labour force participation 1; Seasonally adjusted quarterly
results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 - 1st Quarter 2018
• Hours: Hours worked by persons in employment 1991:I-2018:I
Source: 2.1.8 Persons in employment, employees and hours worked (domestic concept)
2; Seasonally adjusted quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie
18 Reihe 1.3 - 1st Quarter 2018
• GDP: 1991:I-2018:I
Nominal source: 2.3.1 Use of gross domestic product at current prices 2; Seasonally
adjusted quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 -
1st Quarter 2018
Real source: 2.3.2 Use of gross domestic product, price-adjusted 2; Seasonally adjusted
quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 - 1st Quarter
2018
• PCE: Private Consumption Expenditures of households 1991:I-2018:I
Nominal source: 2.3.3 Final consumption expenditure at current prices 3; Seasonally
adjusted quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 -
1st Quarter 2018
Real source: 2.3.4 Final consumption expenditure at , price-adjusted; Seasonally adjusted
quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 - 1st Quarter
2018
• Govern. Consumption: Government final consumption expenditure (domestic use)
1991:I-2018:I
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Nominal source: 2.3.3 Final consumption expenditure at current prices 3; Seasonally
adjusted quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 -
1st Quarter 2018
Real source: 2.3.4 Final consumption expenditure at , price-adjusted; Seasonally adjusted
quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 - 1st Quarter
2018
• Investment: Gross fixed capital formation 1991:I-2018:I
Nominal source: 2.3.1 gross fixed capital formation at current prices 2; Seasonally adjusted
quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 - 1st Quarter
2018
Real source: 2.3.2 gross fixed capital formation, price-adjusted 2; Seasonally adjusted
quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 - 1st Quarter
2018
• Net Exports: Balance of exports and imports 1991:I-2018:I
Nominal source: 2.3.1 Balance of exports and imports at current prices 2; Seasonally
adjusted quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 -
1st Quarter 2018
Real source: 2.3.2 Balance of exports and imports, price-adjusted 2; Seasonally adjusted
quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and BV4.1 - Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3 - 1st Quarter
2018
• Durables: Langlebige Güter (Durable Goods) 1991:I-2018:I
Nominal source: 2.14 Konsumausgaben der privaten Haushalte im Inland nach Dauer-
haftigkeit der Güter, Saison- und kalenderbereinigt in jeweiligen Preisen 4; Private Kon-
sumausgaben und Verfügbares Einkommen - 1. Vierteljahr 2018
Real source: 2.14 Konsumausgaben der privaten Haushalte im Inland nach Dauerhaftigkeit
der Güter, Saison- und kalenderbereinigt - preisbereinigt 4; Private Konsumausgaben und
Verfügbares Einkommen - 1. Vierteljahr 2018
(available in German only: Domestic consumer spending on durable goods, seasonally




All three essays in this thesis deal with heterogeneous assets in Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models by differentiating between productive market and utility augmenting
private assets. In Chapter 2 and 3 the utility augmenting asset represents housing whereas in
Chapter 4 durable consumption goods.
All models in Chapter 2 and 3 try to account for common puzzling stylized facts from the
housing and the business cycle literature inside the Real Business Cycle (RBC) framework, where
markets are perfect and fluctuations are induced by the supply side. These stylized facts read as
follows: i) residential investment is at least moderately more volatile than business investment,
ii) house prices are at least twice as volatile as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and iii) house
prices, business investment as well as GDP are positively correlated with residential investment.
In Fehrle (2019) (Chapter 2), I show that the multi-sectoral model from Davis and Heathcote
(2005), which is a baseline in the RBC literature concerning housing, accounts for correlated
movements between residential investment and business investment only if shocks towards
sectoral productivity are jointly distributed. The explanatory power of the model generally
worsens without correlated shocks. However, I show that by introducing adjustment costs and
variable capital utilization the model’s explanatory power without correlated shocks becomes at
least as good as the baseline of Davis and Heathcote (2005) with correlated shocks.
In Fehrle and Heiberger (2020) (Chapter 3), we additionally take stylized facts of asset return
statistics into account. These are i) a stable risk-free rate smaller than 2.25 percent, ii) return
rates on equity moderately larger than returns on housing, iii) risk premia on equity, on housing
and on total risk larger than 3 percent, iv) return rates and premia on equity which are at least
twice as volatile as return rates and premia on housing and on total risk, and v) a Sharpe ratio
of housing significantly larger than the Sharpe ratio of equity. In models which rely on habit
formations and capital adjustment costs, housing provides an insurance against fluctuations
in marginal utility as long as the transformability between new houses and consumption is
sufficiently feasible. The insurance induces a demand effect which contributes to explanations
of puzzling business cycle statistics. However, since the household has an insurance option,
he charges too low risk premia to take over aggregated risk. As the transformability becomes
insufficient, e.g. by introducing limited sectoral mobility, the insurance disappears, and certainly,
the household charges high risk premia. However, the demand effect disappears as well, and
as a consequence, the model does not contribute to explanations of puzzling business cycle
characteristics. An otherwise standard RBC model with housing and time-varying disaster risk is
more promising. Since the household cannot insure against rare disasters, he charges sizable risk
premia. Further, the model explains the different risk premia of housing and equity, the volatility
of the return on aggregated risk, housing and the risk-free rate as well as for the stylized facts
concerning the business cycle statistics. Time-varying risk contributes heavily to explanations of
the mentioned stylized facts. The major disadvantage of the model is its inability to disentangle
the Sharp ratios of equity and housing.
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In Fehrle and Huber (2020) (Chapter 4), we apply the Business Cycle Accounting (BCA)
procedure proposed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) to investigate the Great Recession in
Germany and the subsequent stimulus measures. Since the literature reports that the procedure
is somewhat difficult and there is no straight methodological implementation of BCA, we first
propose a well-performing procedure. This procedure includes approaches we found scattered
in the literature or we developed by ourselves. Afterwards, we quantify the contribution to the
business cycle of distortions in the new durable consumption goods, the productive investment
goods, and the labor market, as well as the contribution of changes in efficiency, government
consumption, and net exports. Our results suggest that the recession was mainly driven by
disruptions in efficiency. Distortions in the market for business investments and a decrease in
net exports also contributed substantially to the crisis. Higher government spending and in
particular distortions in the market for new durable consumption goods acted counter-cyclically.
We attribute both counter-cyclical effects to the fiscal stimulus and conclude that the measures
in the durable markets, namely durable subsidies, were more efficient. The different signs in
the contribution to the business cycle of new durables and productive investments indicate
that their segregation is a necessity for the object of the present investigation. Thus, previous
studies applying BCA for the Great Recession in Germany underrate distortions of investments
in productive assets by treating them as an aggregator including new durables. Lastly, our
results suggest that the recovery was driven by a fast rehabilitating labor market. However, the
assignment of the labor market drivers’ determinants is not as apparent as of other determinants,
e.g., of the durable market distortions.
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